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They blend along small-town streets
Like a race of giants that have faded into mere mythology.1
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles”
I. SAFETY, COMPETITION, RELIABILITY, RATE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS
POSED BY UTILITY POLE ASSOCIATION RULES AND ROLES
The humble wooden utility pole, first deployed in America in 1844 to extend
telegraph service,2 forms the twenty-first century’s technological scaffold.
Many states adopted laws in the mid-nineteenth through the early twentieth
centuries granting rights-of-way (ROW) to construct utility poles, wires, and
facilities to transmit electric and communications signals.3 First telegraph, then
telephone, electricity, cable, wireless, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
1. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS (1963).
2. See April Mulqueen & Marzia Zafar, A Brief Introduction to Utility Poles, CAL. PUB.
UTIL. COMM’N 5 (2014), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/
About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work/PPDUtilityPole.pdf
[hereinafter Mulqueen, Brief Introduction to Utility Poles].
3. See, e.g., An Act Concerning Corporations, ch. 128, § 150, 1850 Cal. Stat. 369; T-Mobile
West LLC v. City & Cty. of S.F., 438 P.3d 239, 244 n.9 (2019) (“The predecessor of Public Utilities
Code section 7901, Civil Code section 536, was first enacted in 1872 as part of the original Civil
Code.”).
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sought to attach facilities to wooden, and later steel or composite, utility poles.4
As the twentieth century dawned, several California electric and telephone
companies formed Joint Pole Committees (JPCs) that stand sentry over utility
pole access through private governance and standard-setting.5 This article
argues that JPC standard-setting outside of regulatory supervision creates a
safety gap in utility pole maintenance and operation and constrains competitive
access to critical utility facilities and ROW. This Article offers a framework to
put safety, competition, and accountable governance at the forefront of utility
pole, conduit, and ROW regulation.
This article lifts the veil JPCs have maintained for more than a century over
their function and rules. JPCs have effectively guarded their rules as member
secrets by not registering as non-profits and operating largely without
government supervision. JPC members include investor-owned utilities (IOUs),
municipal utilities, irrigation districts, and some municipalities that have formed
associations to “share expenses regarding ownership, maintenance, use, setting,
replacement, dismantling, relinquishment or removal of jointly owned
poles.”6 The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and competition
authorities owe no deference to JPC standards, rules, functions, or decisions.7
Scrutiny of JPC rules, roles, and risks is long overdue.
The CPUC’s 2016 Competition Order Instituting Investigation (OII)—which
my colleagues and I unanimously voted to adopt when I served as a CPUC
Commissioner—observed that “utility poles, whether owned by electric utilities
or legacy phone companies or jointly, and corresponding rights of way are areas
where safety and competition goals, and asserted property rights, meet and
potentially clash.”8 The CPUC concluded that “[i]f a pole association had
4. April Mulqueen, A Natural History of the Wooden Utility Pole, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N
8-11 (July 2017), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/
About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work_Products_(2014_forward)(1
)/UtilityPoleBook060617.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Southern California Joint Pole Committee, SCJPC.NET, scjpc.net, May 11,
2020.
6. See, e.g., About the NCJPA, N. CAL. JOINT POLE ASS’N, http://www.ncjpa.org/about/ (last
visited June 11, 2020).
7. Final Arbitrator’s Report In Re Application of Crown Castle NG West LLC (U6745C),
Pursuant to Decision 98-10-058 for Arbitration of Dispute over Denial by Pacific Gas and Electric
Company (U39E) of Access to Utility Support Structures, Application 18-10-004, CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N 2 (Jan. 31, 2019), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M318/
K554/318554372.pdf [hereinafter CPUC Final Arbitrator’s Report, Crown Castle PG&E
Arbitration]. See also Decision Affirming Final Arbitrator’s Report and Order That Parties Adopt
Revised License Agreement, Decision 19-10-037, Application 18-10-004, CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N 2-3 (October 24, 2019).
8. Decision Analyzing the California Telecommunications Market And Directing Staff To
Continue Data Gathering Monitoring And Reporting On The Market in the Order Instituting
Investigation into the State of Competition Among Telecommunications Providers in California,
and to Consider and Resolve Questions raised in the Limited Rehearing of Decision 08-09-042,
Decision 16-12-025, Investigation 15-11-007, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 110 (Dec. 1, 2016),
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internal policies, membership rules, or other standards that effectively operated
to exclude new members or make their pole access onerous, that would raise
concerns about barriers to market entry.”9
In 2017, the CPUC initiated a Utility Pole Census and Competitive Access
OII and Order Instituting Rulemaking (OIR) (I.17-06-027, and R.17-06-028) to
analyze JPC functions, utility pole safety, competition, and maintenance issues,
and to consider ordering a utility pole census.10 The CPUC explained that
“[c]ompetitive carriers like Sonic and Google Fiber/Webpass have complained
about difficulties they have experienced in trying to attach to poles and access
underground conduit.”11 The CPUC’s proceedings seek to determine whether
the JPCs, the Northern California Joint Pole Association (NCJPA) or the
Southern California Joint Pole Committee (SCJPC), “have policies, membership
rules, or other standards in effect that operate to exclude new members or make
access to poles onerous or even impossible.”12
Neither JPCs nor their members enjoy immunities from federal antitrust or
state unfair competition laws. Nor are JPCs exempt from tort laws for operation
and maintenance policies and practices that contribute to hazards or unduly
interfere with prospective business advantage. JPCs are not privileged to
undermine CPUC rules and policies designed to promote safety and competitive
utility pole access, twin policies that are often intertwined.
My research found no academic articles examining the role, rules, and risks
of utility pole associations in pole access and management. This Article fills
that academic and regulatory analysis gap by examining JPCs’ history and
function as California faces climate change, higher safety and fire risks, and an
altered competitive landscape.
Analyzing utility governance and infrastructure safety risks is a top priority as
climate change and drought fuel California’s fire risk.13 In California, “[f]ifteen

http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M171/K031/171031953.pdf [hereinafter
CPUC Competition OII Decision 16-12-025].
9. Id. at 181 (citing Allied Tube v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509 (1988) (“hope of
procompetitive benefits depends upon the existence of safeguards sufficient to prevent the
standard‐ setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in restraining
competition.”)).
10. Order Instituting Investigation Into The Creation Of A Shared Database Or Statewide
Census Of Utility Poles And Conduit In The Order Instituting Rulemaking Into Access By
Competitive Communications Providers To California Utility Poles And Conduit, Consistent With
The Commission’s Safety Regulations, Investigation, 17-06-027, Rulemaking 17-06-028, CAL.
PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 4 (July 10, 2017), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/
M191/K656/191656519.PDF [hereinafter CPUC Pole Census OII].
11. Id.
12. Id. at 43.
13. See Decision Approving Pilots for Matinee Pricing, Decision 16-11-021, CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N 2 (Nov. 10, 2016) http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M169/
K487/169487466.PDF (“California is undergoing an unprecedented drought, replete with grim
implications for California’s economy in general, and for energy supply, food supply and farm-
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of the 20 most destructive wildfires in the state’s history have occurred since
2000; ten of the most destructive fires have occurred since 2015.”14 California
Governor Newsom’s Energy and Wildfire Strike Force reported in 2019 that
“[i]n the past four years, equipment owned by California’s three largest investorowned utilities sparked more than 2,000 fires.”15 Longer fire seasons make
utility-caused fires even more likely.
In 2014, the Union of Concerned Scientists identified several consequences
of climate change for the energy sector including the following: accelerating sea
level rise; increasing wildfires; more frequent and intense heat waves; droughts
and reduced water supplies; and elevated water temperatures.16 As Governor
Newsom’s Strike Force advised, “[h]ardening the electrical grid is thus a critical
component to overall wildfire risk management.”17 Further, “[m]easures
commonly used to harden the electrical grid include using insulated electrical
lines in high-risk areas, replacing wood poles with steel, installing specialized
monitoring equipment, and using new technologies that can reduce sparks or
undergrounding lines when necessary in extreme high-fire areas.”18 Utility pole,
infrastructure, and ROW governance is critical to grid hardening, safety,
reliability, competition, and the achievement of climate change mitigation
strategies.19
A. Article Organization
Part II of this Article traces the historical development of utility rights-of-way
rules in California. It examines JPC formation at the turn-of-the twentieth
century, followed by California state policies to promote competition and safety.
Part III examines interrelated principles that animate state and federal regulation

related employment in particular. On January 17, 2014, Governor Brown declared a Drought State
of Emergency . . . On April 25, 2014, the Governor declared a continued state of emergency.”).
14. Governor Newsom’s Strike Force, Wildfires and Climate Change: California’s Energy
Future 1 (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Wildfires-andClimate-Change-California’s-Energy-Future.pdf (emphasis removed) (“Warmer temperatures,
variable snowpack, and earlier snowmelt caused by climate change make for longer and more
intense dry seasons, leaving forests more susceptible to severe fire.”).
15. Id. at 2 (citing Carolyn Kousky et al., Wildfire Costs In California: The Role of Electric
Utilities, WHARTON RISK MGMT. AND DECISION PROCESSES CTR. (Sept. 2018),
https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Wildfire-Cost-in-CA-Role-ofUtilities-1.pdf).
16. Power Failure: How Climate Change Puts Our Electricity at Risk, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/power-failure.
17. Governor Newsom’s Strike Force, supra note 14, at 2.
18. Id. at. n.9.
19. See Catherine Sandoval, Principles for Utility Regulation in the Face of Increasing
Wildfire Risk, Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.scu.edu/ethics/all-about-ethics/principles-for-utility-regulation-in-the-face-ofincreasing-wildfire-risk/ [hereinafter Catherine Sandoval, Principles for Utility Regulation in the
Face of Increasing Wildfire Risk].
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of utility pole access: competition and reliability, along with state focus on
safety.
Part IV analyzes the NCJPA’s restrictive membership rules that confer
incumbents with effective veto power over potential competitors whom the
CPUC authorizes to attach to utility poles.20 It also examines NCJPA’s 2017
representations to the CPUC about its status as a “non-profit formedto [sic] be
formed.”21 NCJPA’s 1998 Agreement states that it will be formed as a nonprofit,22 a fact that indicates NCJPA’s 2017 representation of its status to the
CPUC is more than a typo. If JPCs were registered non-profits, their bylaws,
articles of incorporation, and more information about their work would be
publicly available. JPC characterization of their organization as a non-profit is
material to attracting members to join and put their poles under JPC control.
Research for this Article reveals the absence of public records of NCJPA
federal or state tax filings or filing for non-profit status in the State of
California23 despite its operation in the state for more than one hundred years.24
The SCJPC has filed federal taxes as a non-profit association 501(c)(12), but
public records neither show that SJPC has filed for non-profit status in
California, nor has it filed California taxes as of December 26, 2020.25
20. See 1998 Northern California Joint Pole Agreement, (January 1, 1998),
https://bsm.sfdpw.org/pics/14WR-0139/NCJPA%20Agreement.pdf;
https://www.perma.cc/YP3A-78G6 [hereinafter NCJPA Agreement].
21. Tina Simms, Panel 1 Presentation at the California Public Utilities Commission Pole and
Conduits Database and Applications Workshop 6 (Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6442453009 (describing NCJPA organization status and
function).
22. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, § 2(b), at 2.
23. Search Query for Northern California Joint Pole Association, PROPUBLICA NONPROFIT
EXPLORER, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=Northern+
California+Joint+Pole+Association&state%5Bid%5D=&ntee%5Bid%5D=&c_code%5Bid%5D=
(last visited Feb. 6, 2021) (finding no results for the Northern California Joint Pole Committee)
[hereinafter ProPublica NCJPA search finding no such non-profit]; NCJPA, OPEN 990,
https://www.open990.org/search/org?name_org=See+all+matches+for+%22NCJPA%22 (search
yielding no results) (last visited Feb. 6, 2021); Northern California Joint Pole Association, OPEN
990,
https://www.open990.org/search/org?name_org=See+all+matches+for+%22Northern+California
+Joint+Pole+Association%22; see State of California Dept. of Justice, Registry Reports,
https://www.oag.ca.gov/charities/reports#crr (no registration found for Northern California Joint
Pole Association or NCJPA) (last visited Feb. 6, 2021); cf. State of California Dept. of Justice,
Registry Reports, https://webapp.ftb.ca.gov/eLetter/ (reporting no results for search for California
Franchise Tax Board filing by Northern California Joint Pole Association or NCJPA) (last visited
Feb. 6, 2021).
24. See sources discussed in supra note 23; see sources discussed in infra note 25.
25. See IRS, Tax Exempt Organization Search, Southern California Joint Pole Committee,
https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/detailsPage?ein=950884090&name=SOUTHERN%20CALIFORNIA
%20JOINT%20POLE%20COMMITTEE&city=&state=&countryAbbr=US&type=returnsSearch
(reporting federal IRS non-profit registration as a 501(c)(12) for Southern California Joint Pole
Committee) (last visited Dec. 26, 2020). Cf. State of California Dept. of Justice, Registry Reports,
https://www.oag.ca.gov/charities/reports#crr (no registration found for Southern California Joint
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California law requires charities including non-profits operating in the State of
California to register with the State26 This Article urges the CPUC and the
California Attorney General’s Office to examine whether NCJPA statements
about its non-profit status constitute an unfair business practice or violate CPUC
rules requiring candor in dealing with the Commission. It recommends that the
California Attorney General’s Office examine the NCJPA and SCJPC’s nonprofit and tax status, determine whether these JPCs have made the requisite state
non-profit registration and tax filings or are exempt, and refer federal tax filing
issues as appropriate.
Part V examines the role and function of utility pole associations and their
competitive significance. Part VI examines competitive barriers erected by JPC
rules and roles focusing on Google’s attempts to deploy fiber services in
California. It analyzes whether utility pole asset transfer transactions facilitated
by the JPC circumvent California Public Utilities Code (CA PU Code) § 851,
which requires the CPUC to approve the sale or transfer of utility assets.
Part VII examines the network effects of utility pole management. This
section argues that California’s policies to promote access to utility poles for
competitors eliminate a potential antitrust defense under Colgate and Trinko that
would otherwise defer to a competitor’s option to choose with whom to deal. It
contends that JPC restrictive membership agreements merit scrutiny under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1 and California’s Cartwright
Act. Part VIII argues that the state action antitrust exemption does not apply to
JPCs. The State of California’s utility pole access policies are designed to
promote, not displace, competition and neither the CPUC, nor any state entity,
actively supervise the JPCs. Part IX concludes with recommendations that the
CPUC, as well as state and federal competition authorities, examine JPC rules
and roles to protect competition.
PG&E’s January 2019 bankruptcy filing following a series of devastating
wildfires linked to utility infrastructure27 underscores the imperative of utility
pole and infrastructure safety, maintenance, and competitive access. Effective
energy and communications markets depend on sound infrastructure to deliver
Pole Committee or SCJPC) (last visited Dec. 26, 2020). Cf. Franchise Tax Board, Self-Serve Entity
Status Letter, https://webapp.ftb.ca.gov/eletter/ (reporting no results for search for California
Franchise Tax Board filing by Southern California Joint Pole Committee or SCJPC) (last visited
Dec. 26, 2020).
26. Initial Registration, Charities, STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF JUSTICE
https://oag.ca.gov/charities/initial-reg (“Every charitable corporation, unincorporated association,
charitable trustee and other legal entities holding property for charitable purposes, must file with
the Attorney General an initial registration form and other documents required by law,” as required
by CA Gov. Code §12585) (last visited Feb. 6, 2021).
27. PG&E CORPORATION AND PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Case No. 19-30088,
Prime Clerk, https://restructuring.primeclerk.com/pge/ (last visited June 11, 2020). DECISION
APPROVING REORGANIZATION PLAN, Decision 20-05-053, Investigation 19-09-016, CAL.
PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (May 28, 2020).
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power and communications services. To promote competition, consumer
choice, affordability, reliability, and safety, this Article sheds light on JPC rules,
roles, and risks.
II. AS THE CENTURIES TURN; HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANACHRONISMS OF JPC
FORMATION
What other tree can you climb where the birds’ twitter,
Unscrambled, is English?28
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles”
A. California Utility Rights of Way Authorization; From the State’s 1850
Admission to the Union through the Dawn of the Twentieth Century
Development of California’s utility pole network, first used for telegraph, then
for telephone, electric, cable, wireless, and Internet services, traces to
California’s Statutes of 1850 adopted shortly after California’s admission to the
Union. “Since 1850, the State of California has authorized the construction and
maintenance of telegraph lines in the roads, highways and other public places in
this state”29 by statute.
In 1850, the California legislature adopted a statewide franchise allowing
telegraph companies to use roads and highways in the state to erect infrastructure
necessary to facilitate telegraph deployment.30 California’s 1850 statute
authorized telegraph companies operating under Congress’ 1866 statute, which
granted a nationwide franchise for the development of telegraph services, to use
California roads and highways.31
With its admission to statehood, California sought to encourage expansion of
the telegraph consistent with its new state authority. For telegraph associations,
the Statutes of 1850 provided
Such association is authorized to construct lines of telegraph along
and upon any of the public roads and highways, or across any of the
waters within the limits of this State, by the erection of the necessary
fixtures, including posts, piers, or abutments, for sustaining the cords
28. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS, supra note 1.
29. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. San Francisco, 17 Cal. Rptr. 687, 691 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
30. An Act to Amend and Supplemental to an Act to Authorize the Formation of Corporations
for the Construction of Plank And Turnpike Roads, ch. 148, § 150, 1857 Cal. Stat. 171; Fredric W.
Kessler, An Old Law Meets a New Technology: Traditional Right-of-Way Access Rights Apply to
Wireless Telephone Technology, NOSSAMAN LLP (Dec. 10, 2004), http://www.nossaman.com/anold-law-meets-new-technology-traditional.
31. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 116 P. 557, 558–60 (Cal. 1911) (citing Act of Congress
approved July 24, 1866, (chapter 230, 14 Stat. 221) (“An act to aid in the construction of telegraph
lines, and to secure to the government the use of the same for postal and military and other
purposes.”)).
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or wires of such lines: Provided, the same shall not be so constructed
as to incommode the public use of said roads and highways, or
injuriously interrupt the navigation of said waters; nor shall this
Chapter be so construed as to authorize the construction of any bridge
across any of the waters of this State.32
The statute authorized telegraph construction including erection of poles to
support wires in a manner so as not to “incommode the public” use of roads and
highways and was codified with minor amendment in 1872 as § 536 of the Civil
Code.33 The California Supreme Court determined in 1911 that California Civil
Code § 536
. . . constituted a grant to telegraph companies of rights in regard to the
streets of cities, in addition to the rights given by the act of Congress,
which to the extent that they were accepted and availed of by any
company, constituted a franchise granted by the state and accepted by
the company.34
This franchise included the use of bridges as part of the state highway system.35
The California Supreme Court characterized the franchise as “an inducement to
the companies [to whom] the State offered the use of roads and highways,
without which there would probably have been no company able or willing to
enter the State. The franchise cost the State nothing. The rewards were great.”36
Telegraph facility construction commenced shortly thereafter and in “1853 a
telegraph line was built from San Francisco to the entrance to the Golden Gate,
and this was the first telegraph in California.”37
California ratified its state constitution in 1879, thereby establishing and
conferring on the California Railroad Commission authority to regulate
utilities.38 That constitutional provision divested municipalities of regulatory
power over utilities but left in place local “control over public utilities as
relate[d] to the making and enforcement of local, police, sanitary and other
regulations, other than the fixing of rates . . . .”39
In 1911, the California legislature adopted an act to “regulate[] the erection
and maintenance of poles, wires, etc., employed in overhead electric line
construction.”40 In 1915, the California legislature required the California
32. County of Los Angeles v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 805, 806 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967).
33. Id.
34. W. Union Tel. Co., 116 P. at 562.
35. See Cty. of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 23 (1879) (repealed 1974).
39. Id.; People ex rel. Freitas v. City & Cty. of S.F., 155 Cal. Rptr. 319, 323-24 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979).
40. Rules for Overhead Electric Line Construction General Order No. 95, CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N x (Jan. 2015), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M146/
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Railroad Commission to “inspect all work affected by the provisions of the act,
and to make such further additions and changes as it might deem necessary for
the protection of employees and the general public.”41
While telegraph service was being extended across the United States, patents
were granted to Alexander Graham Bell in 1876 and 1877 for “improvements in
telegraphy,” the telegraph, and “improvements in electric telephony,” now
known as the telephone.42 The same year Bell’s first telephone patents were
granted, the Supreme Court, in Munn v. Illinois, recognized the authority of
states to regulate common carriers and public utilities.43 State regulation enabled
the growth of telephone service and telephone companies by facilitating access
to rights-of-way and telegraph poles to string wires carrying telephone signals.
California Civil Code § 536 was adopted in 1905 to encourage expansion of
telegraph and telephone facilities and services.44 In 1906, a year after the State
of California extended rights-of-way franchises to telephone as well as telegraph
companies, AT&T, Southern California Edison (SCE), and others formed the
SCJPC, California’s first known JPC.45
Three years later in 1909, AT&T bought a controlling share of Western Union,
the nation’s largest telegraph company.46 Through its purchase of 30,000
Western
Union
stock
shares, AT&T “effectively
gain[ed]
working control of Western Union.”47 Professor Susan Crawford recounts
AT&T’s and Western Union’s April 1910 “joint traffic agreement” that allowed
users to send from any telephone a message “to any part of the world by the joint
use of telephone, telegraph, and cable wires.”48 The joint traffic agreement
K646/146646565.pdf [hereinafter CPUC General Order 95] (citing the Act passed by the
California Legislature on April 22, 1911, Ch. 499, Stat. of 1911, regulating overhead utility lines).
41. Id. (citing The Statues [sic] of 1915, Ch. 600, amending Ch. 499).
42. Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 456, 456 (1888). See also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs.,
525 U.S. 55, 55 (1998) (noting that The Telephone Cases upheld several patents issued
to Alexander Graham Bell ”even though he had filed his application before constructing a
working telephone.”).
43. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 129–30 (1876).
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 536 (1986) (repealed 1997). See also Petaluma v. Pac. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 282 P.2d 43, 46 (1955) (“[S]ection 536, tendered to all [telephone and telegraph] corporations
a franchise to use the highways for their lines, an acceptance of which is signified by their act in
constructing the same over the highways so offered.”).
45. See Southern California Joint Pole Committee, OPEN 990, https://www.open990.com/
org/950884090/southern-california-joint-pole-committee/ (last visited June 11, 2020) (stating that
it SCJPC is Tax-Exempt, BMF [Business Master File] updated April 17, 2020).
46. Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 924 (2009)
(citing JOHN BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 134 (1976)). See Southern
California Joint Pole Committee, OPEN 990, https://www.open990.com/org/950884090/southerncalifornia-joint-pole-committee/ (last visited June 11, 2020) (stating that SCJPC is Tax-Exempt
under 501(c)(12) from federal taxation, BMF [Business Master File] updated April 17, 2020).
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting Wire Companies’ Merger: Western Union and Telephone Officer Discuss
Joint Traffic Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1910, at 6).
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sought to enable “an answer received promptly at the sending point without the
necessity of the sender moving from his office or his home.”49
Several independent telephone companies developed in the late 1800s through
the early 1900s complained to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) about
AT&T’s allegedly anti-competitive conduct following the adoption of Sherman
Anti-Trust Act in 1890.50 In 1913, the DOJ brought an antitrust case against
AT&T under § 2 of the Sherman Act alleging that AT&T abused its market
power.51 The DOJ complaint alleged that the Bell system telephone companies
AT&T controlled had “harassed” independent telephone companies “by
refusing to interconnect Bell lines through with those of the independents, by
lowering competitive rates, by furnishing poor service when ordered to
interconnect their lines, and by otherwise acting in an illegal manner.”52
AT&T’s December 1913 “Kingsbury Commitment” led to the settlement of the
DOJ’s antitrust suit.53 AT&T agreed to dispose of its Western Union stock, to
“refrain from acquiring competing telephone companies, and [to] offer toll-line
connections to qualified independent telephone companies.”54
That same year in 1913, AT&T and incumbent electric providers, including
the predecessors of PG&E, formed the NCJPA.55 The Kingsbury Commitment
did not address control of utility pole facilities, conduits, and rights-of-way
critical to telegraph, telephone, as well as electric deployment and competition.
NCJPA helped AT&T and the forerunners of PG&E extend telephone and
electric service and consolidate market power in the utility pole and ROW

49. Id. (quoting Wire Companies’ Merger: Western Union and Telephone Officer Discuss
Joint Traffic Agreement, N.Y. TIMES Apr. 1, 1910, at 6). See also id. at n.251 (reporting that AT&T
and Western Union emphasized that they were not merging. As the article explained, “[t]he
telegraph and the telephone companies will continue separate and distinct organizations. There has
been no absorption, no merging, no consolidation. Each has its own field, but there are certain
points where they may meet on common ground and by mutual traffic arrangements increase their
opportunities for public service.”).
50. See Geoffrey M. Peters, Is the Third Time the Charm? A Comparison of the
Government’s Major Antitrust Settlements with AT&T This Century, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 252,
253 (1985). See also Act July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C.A. § 1–7 (2012)).
51. Peters, supra note 50, at 254 (citing Original Petition, United States v. AT&T (D. Or.
1913) (suit terminated by consent decree Mar. 26, 1914)).
52. Id. (citing Original Petition, United States v. AT&T (D. Or. 1913) at 16-19, 26).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 255 (citing Letter from Nathan C. Kingsbury to Attorney General J. C. McReynolds
(Dec. 19, 1913) reprinted in 1913 AT&T Annual Report); United States v. W. Elec. Co., 531 F.
Supp. 894, 913 (D. N.J. 1981).
55. Catherine Sandoval, Contested Places, Utility Pole Spaces; Safety-Centric Utility Pole
and Infrastructure Regulation and Competition, ADVANCED WORKSHOP IN REGULATION AND
COMPETITION
38TH
ANNUAL
EASTERN
CONFERENCE
(May
29-31,
2019),
https://1x937u16qcra1vnejt2hj4jl-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/ContestedPlaces-Utility-Pole-Spaces-Putting-Safety-at-the-Center-of-Utility-Pole-and-InfrastructureCompetition-and-Regulation-May-2019.pdf.
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market, expanding beyond the construction rights and utility franchise rights
granted under California Civil Code § 536.56
As states and later the federal government increased regulatory oversight
following Munn v. Illinois in 1876,57 and adopted the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890 to restrain anti-competitive conduct,58 JPCs formed outside of the
government’s purview. In 1911, the California Constitution was amended to
vest the California Railroad Commission with “exclusive jurisdiction to
supervise and regulate public utilities and to prescribe the character and quality
of the service and fix the compensation therefor.”59 The SCJPC was formed in
1906, and the NCJPA in 1913, but some of their members have argued that they
are not subject to state public utility regulation as a private association.60
JPCs have operated in a jurisdictional fissure by arguing that the association
is not subject to utility regulation despite the fact that many of their members are
investor-owned utilities and use or control utility assets. Subsequent California
legislation conferred the CPUC with “jurisdiction to regulate . . . electric
transmission and distribution facilities of publicly owned utilities . . . for the
limited purpose” of protecting worker and public safety.61 JPCs have adopted
rules and standards outside of CPUC purview, even as the CPUC adopted
regulations to promote safety, competitive telecommunications access, and
reliability. JPCs remain historical and legal anachronisms that increasingly
clash with state competition and safety rules, laws, and policies.

56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 536 (1986) (repealed 1997).
57. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
58. 15 U.S.C.S § 1 (2012) (originally enacted as Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, ch. 647, §
1 (1890)).
59. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 282 P.2d 36, 41 (1955). See also CAL. CONST. art.
XII, § 23 (1879) (repealed 1974).
60. Comments of California Municipal Utilities Association on Administrative Law Judge’s
Ruling Requesting Comments on The Role of Joint Pole Associations in Acting as Clearinghouses
for Pole Location, Ownership, Attachment, and Access Information, Investigation 17-06-027
(Rulemaking 17-06-028), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (Feb. 15, 2019) http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M273/K147/273147232.PDF [hereinafter CMUA Comments].
61. Decision Adopting Regulations to Enhance Fire Safety in the High Fire-Threat District
in the Order Instituting Rulemaking to Develop and Adopt Fire-Threat Maps and Fire-Safety
Regulations, Decision 17-12-024 (Rulemaking 15-05-006), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 14 (Dec. 14,
2017) (citing CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8002, 8037, & 8056) [hereinafter CPUC D.17-12-024]
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M200/K976/200976667.PDF; Decision
Adopting Regulations To Reduce Fire Hazards Associated With Overhead Power Lines And
Communication Facilities, Decision 12-01-032 (Rulemaking 08-11-005), CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N 11 (Jan. 12, 2012), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/WORD_PDF/
FINAL_DECISION/157605.PDF.
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B. Establishment of the California Public Utilities Commission, Competitive
Infrastructure Access, and Rights-of-Way Authorization
In 1911, through a voter-approved constitutional amendment, the California
Railroad Commission was added to the California Constitution.62 In 1915, soon
after the NCJPA was founded, and nearly a decade after the SCJPC’s
organization, California adopted a law authorizing the California Railroad
Commission to order access to another utility’s poles, conduits, and rights-ofway to facilitate competition and service.63 For more than a century, California
law has recognized the competitive significance of utility pole and right-of-way
access to the deployment of utility services, and authorized the CPUC to order
joint use of poles.64
In 1951, California updated the law authorizing access to rights-of-ways to
expand telephone and telegraph service and infrastructure.65 Shortly after the
conclusion of World War II, in 1946, the California legislature renamed the
Railroad Commission as the California Public Utilities Commission.66 The 1915
law authorizing the Railroad Commission to order access to other utilities’
facilities was updated in 1951 through CA PU Code § 767.67 That legislation
allows the CPUC to direct the joint use of “all or any part of the conduits,
subways, tracks, wires, poles, pipes, or other equipment, on, over, or under any
street or highway, and belonging to another public utility,” where “such use will
not result in irreparable injury to the owner or other users of such property or
62. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 1–6; Anchor Lighting v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 780,
784 (2006) (citations omitted) (“The CPUC is constitutionally empowered to regulate utilities and
to fix rates, establish rules, hold various types of hearings, award reparation, and establish its own
procedures, and legislatively empowered to do ‘all things . . . necessary and convenient in the
exercise of such power and jurisdiction.’”); CA PU Code 701; CPUC History & Organizational
Structure, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/history/ (last visited May 10, 2019).
63. An Act to Provide for the Organization of the Railroad Commission, ch. 91, § 41, 1915
Cal. Stat. 136.
64. Id.
65. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7901 (1951) (“Telegraph or telephone corporations may
construct lines of telegraph or telephone lines along and upon any public road or highway, along
or across any of the waters or lands within this State, and may erect poles, posts, piers, or abutments
for supporting the insulators, wires, and other necessary fixtures of their lines, in such manner and
at such points as not to incommode the public use of the road or highway or interrupt the navigation
of the waters.”).
66. CPUC History and Organizational Structure, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N ,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/history/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
67. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 767 (1951) (“Whenever the commission, after a hearing had
upon its own motion or upon complaint of a public utility affected, finds that public convenience
and necessity require the use by one public utility of all or any part of the conduits, subways, tracks,
wires, poles, pipes, or other equipment, on, over, or under any street or highway, and belonging to
another public utility, and that such use will not result in irreparable injury to the owner or other
users of such property or equipment or in any substantial detriment to the service, and that such
public utilities have failed to agree upon such use or the terms and conditions or compensation
therefor, the commission may by order direct that such use be permitted, and prescribe a reasonable
compensation and reasonable terms and conditions for the joint use.”).
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equipment or in any substantial detriment to the service . . . .”68 CA PU Code §
767 entitles the utility facility or conduit owner to “reasonable compensation and
reasonable terms and conditions for the joint use.”69 Decades before multiple
providers of wireless, wireline, Internet, and electric service contested utility
pole access, California adopted policies to promote competitive access to poles
and rights-of-way.
C. Competition for Utility Pole Access with the Rise of Cable, the 1996
Telecommunications Act, and the CPUC’s 1998 Rights-of-Way Decision
Federal law sought to promote utility competition and service to the American
public through utility pole access beginning in the 1970s. Congress expanded
utility pole access to cable companies in 1978 through the Pole Attachments Act
(47 U.S.C. § 224).70
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 expanded pole attachment rights under
§ 224 to telecommunications carriers.71 The 1996 Telecommunications Act
requires that “[a] utility shall provide a cable television system or any
telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct,
conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by it.”72 47 U.S.C. § 224 “gave
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) jurisdiction to regulate the
rates, terms, and conditions of attachments by cable television operators to the
poles, conduit or ROW owned or controlled by utilities in the absence of parallel
state regulation.”73
Congress allowed states to exercise reverse “preemption” through 47 U.S.C.
§ 224(c)(1) over FCC jurisdiction of communications infrastructure access.74
After a state adopts its own utility pole access rules, the FCC loses “jurisdiction
with respect to rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts, conduits,
and rights-of-way as provided in subsection (f) . . . for pole attachments in any
case where such matters are regulated by a State.”75 Under 47 U.S.C. § 253,
states may adopt “on a competitively neutral basis and consistent with Section
254, requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect
the public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of
telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.”76
Furthermore, “section 253 specifically recognizes the authority of state and local
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (f)(1) (2012).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion into Competition for
Local Exchange Service, Decision 98-10-058, 1998 Cal. PUC LEXIS 879, *7–8 (Cal. P.U.C.
October 22, 1998) [hereinafter CPUC Decision 98-10-058 or ROW Decision].
74. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1).
75. Id.
76. CPUC Decision 98-10-058 or ROW Decision, supra note 73, at 10.
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governments to manage public ROW and to require fair and reasonable
compensation for the use of such ROW.”77
The CPUC 1998 ROW Decision 98-10-058 exercised reverse preemption of
FCC communications infrastructure jurisdiction. Through the rules adopted in
Decision 98-10-058, the CPUC “certif[ied] to the FCC that [it] regulate[s] the
rate, terms, and conditions of access to poles, ducts, conduits, and ROW in
conformance with §§ 224(c)(2) and (3).”78
The CPUC’s 1998 ROW Decision 98-10-058 seeks to promote competition
and allows CLECs to access investor-owned utility poles.79 That decision
authorized CLECs, competitors to telephone companies, and cable television
corporations to attach their facilities to jointly or singly owned utility poles. The
CPUC’s ROW decision provides “facilities-based competitive local
communications carriers (CLCs) and cable television (TV) corporations with
nondiscriminatory access to utility poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way.”80
The CPUC has since expanded ROW access to other types of services such as
video providers and commercial mobile radio services.
The 1998 ROW decision mandates access to certain types of utility
infrastructure including poles and rights-of-way “owned or controlled by (1)
large and midsized incumbent local exchange carriers, and (2) major investorowned electric utilities.”81 Parties may also enter into voluntary attachment
arrangements under CA PU Code § 767.7(a)(3).82 Decision 98-10-058
authorizes the CPUC to arbitrate access disputes.83
A utility pole attacher is “any person, corporation, or other entity or their
agents or contractors seeking to permanently or temporarily fasten or affix any
type of equipment, antenna, line or facility of any kind to a utility pole in the
right of way or its adjacent ground space.”84 A “Pre–Existing Third Party User”
is “the owner of any currently operating facilities, antenna, lines or equipment
on a pole or its adjacent ground space in the right of way,” while a “Pole Owner”
is “a person, corporation or entity having ownership of a pole or similar structure
in the right of way to which utilities . . . are located.”85

77. Id.
78. Id. at 12.
79. Id. at 1.
80. Decision Denying Google Fiber Inc.’s Petition to Modify Decision 07-03-014,
Rulemaking 06-10-005, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 2–3 (May 7, 2015) [hereinafter CPUC Decision
15-05-002] (discussing the scope of the CPUC’s 1998 ROW decision).
81. Id. at 3.
82. Id. at 23.
83. See, e.g., CPUC Final Arbitrator’s Report, Crown Castle PG&E Arbitration, supra note
7, at 3 n.9.
84. BellSouth Telecomms., LLC v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 275 F. Supp. 3d
833, 835 (W.D. Ky. 2017) (citation omitted).
85. Id. (citation omitted).
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The CPUC’s Rights of Way decision promotes competition, service, and
safety by increasing access to utility infrastructure and the property rights
necessary to reach those facilities. This decision eliminates the utility pole
owner’s freedom to refuse to deal with a third party whom the CPUC authorizes
to attach to a pole.86 The CPUC’s competitive access policies limit a trader’s
freedom to choose with whom to deal, while the lack of state supervision of the
JPCs eliminate an antitrust law defense to any allegedly anticompetitive
activities.87
The CPUC Pole Census OII describes utility poles as contested spaces with
significant safety implications.88 The Competition OII Decision recognized that
“lack of access to poles and conduit is a critical obstacle to making the
telecommunications market fully competitive.”89 The CPUC’s Competition OII
Decision found that “[c]ompetitive bottlenecks and barriers to entry, including
lack of access to poles, conduit and other legacy network infrastructure, limit
new entrants and may raise prices for some telecommunications services above
efficiently competitive levels.”90 It expressed concern about utility pole
associations as a potential competitive bottleneck underscoring “the possibility
that pole owners, individually or in pole associations, may be in position to
exercise a type of bottleneck control that has the potential to exclude
competitors.”91
CPUC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Miles’ January 2019 Final
Arbitrator’s Report regarding CLEC Crown Castle’s petition for CPUC
arbitration of the dispute about its request to buy utility pole space from PG&E
observed that, “by virtue of their incumbent status and control over essential
ROW and bottleneck facilities, ILECs [incumbent local exchange carriers] and
incumbent electric utilities have a significant bargaining advantage in

86. See CPUC Decision 98-10-058 or ROW Decision, supra note 73, at 1. See also United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“In the absence of any purpose to create or
maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.”); cf. United States v. Parke, 362 U.S. 29, 45
(1960) (“The program upon which Parke Davis embarked to promote general compliance with its
suggested resale prices plainly exceeded the limitations of the Colgate doctrine and under BeechNut and Bausch & Lomb effected arrangements which violated the Sherman Act . . . . Parke Davis
used the refusal to deal with the wholesalers in order to elicit their willingness to deny Parke Davis
products to retailers and thereby help gain the retailers’ adherence to its suggested minimum retail
prices.”).
87. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 US 438, 448 (2009); Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408–11 (2004) (citations
omitted); Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at 307.
88. CPUC Pole Census OII, supra note 10, at 14–18, 35.
89. CPUC Competition OII Decision 16-12-025, supra note 8, at 110.
90. Id. at 189.
91. Id. at 181.
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comparison to CLCs [Competitive Local Exchange Carriers].”92
She
emphasized that “a key principle of the [CPUC 1998] ROW Decision is that
CLCs should have rights to obtain access to utility poles and support structures
. . .”93 The CPUC is empowered to protect employee and public safety arising
from use of utility distribution and transmission poles, including those owned
by Publicly-Owned Utilities (POUs).94 California law gives the CPUC broad
authority to regulate IOUs and “do all things” necessary to exercise its power.95
The CPUC adopted a decision in June 2020 in the utility pole census OII
requiring the five major utility pole owners in California, Pacific Gas and
Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas &
Electric Company, Frontier Communications, and AT&T, to submit data on
utility pole characteristics by June 2021. 96 The pole census and competition OII
and OIR, I. 17-06-027 and R. 17-06-028 remain open to consider remaining
issues such as competitive access concerns including JPCs. This Article urges
the CPUC to promptly use its authority to examine JPC rules, roles, and risks to
public safety, competition and reliability.
III. SAFETY, RELIABILITY, AND COMPETITION; INTERTWINED VALUES FOR
UTILITY POLE GOVERNANCE
Each a Gorgon’s head, which, seized right, Could stun us to stone.97
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles”
On utility poles, safety, reliability, and competition meet.98 In 1922, the
California Railroad Commission adopted General Order (GO) No. 64, regulating
and authorizing inspection of overhead electric line construction.99 Those rules
have been revised several times and form part of the CPUC’s rules, orders,
decisions, and resolutions.

92. CPUC Final Arbitrator’s Report, Crown Castle PG&E Arbitration, supra note 7, at 6;
Decision 19-10-037, supra note 7, at 8 (“A key principle of D.98-10-058 (ROW Decision) is that
CLCs [competitive local exchange carriers] should have rights to obtain access to utility poles and
support structures at reasonable terms and prices which do not impose a barrier to competition.”)
93. Id.
94. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 451, 701, 8002, 8037, & 8056 (1951).
95. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701.
96. Decision Approving Track 1 Workshop Report Work Plans For San Diego Gas & Electric
Company, Southern California Gas Company, Pacific Gas And Electric Company, AT&T, and
Frontier Communications of California, Decision 20-06-004, Investigation 17-06-027, Rulemaking
17-06-028, 4, June 11, 2020.
97. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS, supra note 1.
98. CPUC Competition OII Decision 16-12-025, supra note 8, at 109–10.
99. CPUC General Order 95, supra note 40, at x (citing California Railroad Commission
General Order 64, adopted May 1, 1922).

490

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 69.3:1

California Public Utilities Code § 451, first adopted in 1951, vests in the
CPUC the duty to promote safe, reliable service, at just and reasonable rates, and
to ensure that regulated entities operate with adequate facilities.100 CA PU Code
§ 701, also adopted in 1951, vests the CPUC with authority to “supervise and
regulate every public utility in the State” and provides that the CPUC “may do
all things, whether specifically designated in this part or in addition thereto,
which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction.”101
The CPUC’s rule governing overhead electric lines, GO 95, also applies to
communications lines, utility poles, and attachments.102 GO 95 includes
“standards for pole ‘loads,’ i.e., the weight and stress on utility poles from
attachments and weather conditions (e.g., heat, wind), and inspection
requirements for communications providers.”103 The CPUC adopted GO 95 to
promote public safety, service reliability, and facilitate competition, as well as
just and reasonable rates.104
Utility pole association members include cities, counties, municipal utilities,
and several investor-owned utilities. The California Municipal Utilities
Association (CMUA) argued that the CPUC “does not have broad generalized
authority beyond public [investor-owned] utilities, and JPAs, such as NCJPA
and SCJPC, are not public utilities.”105
The CPUC has broad jurisdiction over investor-owned utilities including
jurisdiction over IOU electric transmission facilities to protect worker and public
safety.106 Utility pole attachment, maintenance, access, and administration
affect safety, competition, reliability, affordability, and achievement of
California’s environmental and climate change objectives.

100. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (1977) (amending ch.764, §451, 1951 Cal. Stat. 2036)
(“Every public utility shall furnish and maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable
service, instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities, including telephone facilities, as defined in
Section 54.1 of the Civil Code, as are necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and
convenience of its patrons, employees, and the public.”).
101. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701.
102. CPUC General Order 95, supra note 40, at xi, III-16.
103. Mulqueen, Brief Introduction to Utility Poles, supra note 2, at 6.
104. CPUC General Order 95, supra note 40, at x, xii, xiv–xv, E-2.
105. CMUA Comments, supra note 60.
106. CAL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1–9; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 451, 701; Utilities and
Industries, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/utilitiesindustries/ (last visited Sept.
15, 2019) (“The CPUC regulates privately owned electric, natural gas, telecommunications, water,
and transportation companies. The CPUC also regulates the safety of both publicly and privately
owned railroad and rail transit companies/agencies, and rail crossings. The CPUC serves the public
interest by protecting consumers and ensuring the provision of safe, reliable utility service and
infrastructure at reasonable rates, with a commitment to environmental enhancement and a healthy
California economy.”); CMUA Comments, supra note 60; CPUC D.17-12-024, supra note 61, at
14 (citing CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8002, 8037, 8056).
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A. The Role of JPCs in Just and Reasonable Rates
JPCs also affect affordability and rates. SCE’s 2015 General Rate Case
(GRC) application proposed to accelerate utility pole maintenance or
replacement to improve safety and reliability.107 Proceeding participant, The
Utility Reform Network (TURN) observed that the SCJPC, “of which SCE is
one of 33 members,” plays a role “in setting the rates for pole replacement and
other costs.”108 SCE’s GRC application forecasted “$20.083 million in credits
from joint users” for utility pole replacement, approximately 10% of the cost of
proposed replacements.109 The CPUC’s GRC authorization directed SCE to
“negotiate with joint users to reach efficient sharing of joint poles and safely
provide electric service.”110
The CPUC’s 2015 SCE GRC decision emphasized
. . . SCE and joint owners and renters should all recognize that we
believe the costs of remediating overloaded joint poles should be
allocated approximately in proportion to the causes of the overloading.
SCE should seek to quantify the causes of pole loading, and attribute
those causes among SCE, joint owners, and renters.111
The Commission directed SCE to “develop solutions to remediate overloading
while avoiding an allocation of costs that results in SCE ratepayers bearing a
disproportionate share” and encouraged “SCE and other interested parties to
expeditiously address these issues.”112 The CPUC’s decision recognizes joint
pole owners’s responsibility for safety and reliability, and the relationship of
pole attachments and rule compliance to rates.
PG&E reported in September 2019 that it had not recovered any contribution
from any NCJPA member for the $3.5 million in costs that PG&E incurred for
the work on hazardous trees near jointly-owned poles.113 PG&E’s GRC witness
William Pender explained that PG&E’s contract with AT&T for “cost recovery”
for expenses related to jointly owned poles expired in 2011 and has not been
renewed.114 Pender reported that “AT&T informally agreed in an email
exchange to reimburse PG&E approximately $700,000 for certain hazardous

107. See Decision on Test Year 2015 General Rate Case for Southern California Edison
Company, Decision 15-11-02, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N at 131-32 (Nov. 5, 2015)
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M155/K759/155759622.PDF [hereinafter
2015 General Rate Case].
108. Id. at 128.
109. Id. at 135.
110. Id. at 136.
111. Id. at 138.
112. Id.
113. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 2020 General Rate Case Rebuttal Testimony Exhibit
(PG&E-26) General Report at 15-1, 15-2 (Sept. 4, 2019) [hereinafter, PG&E, Pender GRC
Testimony].
114. Id. at 15-3.
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tree removal work on jointly owned poles performed in both 2012 and 2013.”115
As Pender indicated, “[b]ased on AT&T’s past practice of accepting its allocated
share of hazard tree removal work, PG&E had an expectation that AT&T would
continue to pay its allocated share for work performed upon receipt of an
invoice.”116
After years of waiting for payments from AT&T which never arrived, PG&E
cancelled $3.5 million in aging unpaid invoices in 2017 for work it believed was
attributable to joint pole ownership expenses “in accordance with accounting
guidelines for ageing unpaid invoices.”117 PG&E’s witness, Pender, reported
that NCJPA “requires a special agreement between the joint owners for recovery
for hazardous tree removal costs.”118 As PG&E explained, NCJPA leaves
expense allocation to pole owners by requiring such agreements.119
CPUC General Order 95 provides rules governing electric lines, poles, and
attachments.120 Vegetation management and clearance requirements adopted
through CPUC General Order 95 apply to “all overhead electrical supply and
communication facilities that are covered by this General Order.”121 Each party
owning or attaching to a pole is responsible for vegetation management and
utility pole safety and reliability.122
The CPUC’s 2006 Decision 06-08-030 ended rate regulation for incumbent
telephone companies, except for designated rural telcos regulated through a
separate framework and fund.123 That CPUC decision aspired to create
incentives for competition and innovation124 through rate regulation repeal for
large telecommunications carriers.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. CPUC General Order 95, supra note 40, at I-3.
121. Id. at III-19.
122. See id. at III-19–III-20.
123. See Opinion in Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion to Assess
and Revise the Regulation of Telecommunications Utilities, Decision 06-08-030, CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N at 2–3, 7 (Aug. 24, 2006), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/WORD_PDF/
FINAL_DECISION/59388.PDF.
124. Id. at 7 (“The new incentive-based regulatory framework proved superior to the traditional
rate-of-return (ROR) method of setting rates for the ILECs [incumbent local exchange carriers].”).
Regarding the theories advanced to support the end of telecommunications rate regulation see e.g.,
National Rural Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 988 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[b]ecause a firm
can pass any cost along to ratepayers (unless it is identified as imprudent), its incentive to innovate
is less sharp than if it were unregulated.”) Id. (“Firms can gain [from rate-of-return regulation] by
shifting costs away from unregulated activities (where consumers would react to higher prices by
reducing their purchases) into the regulated ones (where the price increase will cause little or no
drop in sales because under regulation the prices are in a range where demand is relatively
unresponsive to price changes). See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers,
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Rate deregulation does not end the obligation of telecommunications
companies to provide safe and reliable service at just and reasonable rates with
adequate facilities under CA PU Code § 451.125 CPUC General Order 95
specifically applies to communications as well as electric companies.126 Rate
deregulation renders costs to comply with CPUC rules such as GO 95 not
directly recoverable through rates. Instead, companies must absorb those costs
or pass them onto consumers in prices.
Rate deregulation does not excuse failure to comply with CPUC rules.
Neither does it justify shifting regulatory compliance and safety costs to electric
companies and their ratepayers or shareholders.
This Article recommends the CPUC act to ensure that electric ratepayers are
not saddled with bills attributable to other joint pole owners or attachers.
PG&E’s bankruptcy underscores the imperative of examining the write-off of
$3.5 million in shared utility pole compliance costs. The CPUC has the authority
and duty to analyze rate-shifting and rule compliance to protect public safety
and ensure that rates remain just and reasonable.
B. CPUC Utility Pole Safety Regulation and JPCs
CPUC regulation of utility poles and attachments has increased since utility
infrastructure maintenance and operation caused several major wildfires in
2007.127 On “October 21, 2007, three wooden utility poles broke and fell to the
ground, and the downed lines sparked . . . [a] vegetation fire” which became the
Malibu Canyon fire.128 In its 2008 adoption of rules to reduce fire hazards
associated with utility poles, attachments, and overhead wires, the CPUC
stressed the urgency of addressing safety issues as recent “wildfires in California
may have been linked to electric and communications facilities and have resulted
in widespread destruction.”129
The CPUC’s Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) reported that violations
of CPUC rules contributed to the Malibu Canyon fire, emphasizing: “(1) the
utility poles were not in compliance with GO 95; (2) if they had been in
compliance with GO 95 they would have been able to withstand the wind gusts;
and (3) that violations of GO 95 were the direct cause of the Malibu Canyon
Fire.”130 The CPUC’s Malibu Canyon Fire investigation found “instances of
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4 FCC Rcd 2873, 2924 (1989). Third, rate-of-return regulation is
costly to administer, as it requires the agency endlessly to calculate and allocate the firm’s costs.”).
125. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (1977) (amending ch.764, §451, 1951 Cal. Stat. 2036).
126. CPUC General Order 95, supra note 40, at III-19.
127. Mulqueen, Brief Introduction to Utility Poles, supra note 2, at 5.
128. Id. at 14.
129. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Revise & Clarify Comm’n Regulations Relating to the
Safety of Elec. Util. & Communications Infrastructure Provider Facilities, No. D. 09-08-029, 2009
WL 2910747 (Aug. 20, 2009).
130. Mulqueen, A Brief Introduction to Utility Poles, supra note 2, at 14 (citing I.09-01-018,
Incident Investigation Report, October 21, 2008 (Attachment), at A-7).
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parties: placing attachments on poles after being denied permission by the pole
owner; using SCJPC rules to evade compliance with GO 95; and failing to fully
respond to Commission investigations.”131
The CPUC’s 1998 ROW Decision prohibits unauthorized pole attachments,
establishes a fine for unauthorized attachments, and provides notice that the
Commission may impose additional sanctions.132 Fires associated with utility
pole attachment, maintenance, and administration highlight the imperative of the
CPUC’s safety function and regulations.
CPUC Decision 13-09-026 criticized respondent telecommunications carriers
in the Malibu Canyon Fire investigation who used “SCJPC rules to evade
compliance with GO 95.”133 CPUC’s SED alleged that “at least one of the poles
which fell and ignited the Malibu Canyon Fire was overloaded in violation of
General Order (GO) 95 and California Public Utilities Code Section 451 (Pub.
Util. Code § 451).”134 According to the SED, the respondents’ interpreted
SCJPC rules “in a way that neglected compliance with GO 95,” contributed to
the substandard pole.135
In its analysis of the Malibu Canyon Fire investigation, the CPUC approved a
settlement that stipulated wireless carrier “NextG used SCJPC procedures to
request permission to attach facilities to Pole 252E. SCE denied the request
based on SCE’s determination that NextG’s proposed attachment would
overload the pole.”136 Later, “NextG contested the determination. After
additional communications between NextG and SCE over an 11-month period,
SCE again denied the proposed attachment.”137 In response, NextG inform[ed]
SCE that it could not deny the request per Section 18.1-D of the SCJPC Routine
Handbook, which provides that a proposed attachment is automatically approved
if no protest or other request for review is received within 45 days.”138 The
CPUC NextG Settlement Agreement “stipulates that the . . . chain of events
[leading to the Malibu Canyon fire] supports ‘the conclusion that the SCJPC
process . . . was not conducive to ensuring that the subject poles were GO 95
compliant.”139
The CPUC’s Malibu Canyon fire investigation and NextG settlement did not
evaluate the SCJPC’s role in safety, reliability, and the CPUC’s exercise of its
131. Id. at 15.
132. CPUC Decision 98-10-058 or ROW Decision, supra note 73, Appendix A, Section VI.D
(Unauthorized Attachments).
133. Mulqueen, Brief Introduction to Utility Poles, supra note 2, at 15.
134. Decision Conditionally Approving the NextG Settlement Agreement, Decision 13-09-026,
CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N at 7 (Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter CPUC NextG Settlement, 2007 Malibu
Canyon Fire].
135. Id.
136. Id. at 17–18.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
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responsibilities. Neither did the CPUC examine whether JPC rules and functions
were consistent with GO 95 or CPUC safety and competitive access rules. In a
2017 update of GO 95 rules to accelerate the required timeframe to address GO
95 violations, several JPC members commented that “rules prohibiting
unauthorized attachments already exist in contracts between parties, the
Commission’s
Right-of-Way
Rules
(“ROW
Rules”),
the Northern California Joint Pole Association Routine Handbook, and the
Southern California Joint Pole Committee Routine Handbook.”140
JPC handbooks are not submitted for CPUC review. They neither provide a
basis for assessing compliance with CPUC safety rules and standards, nor does
the CPUC owe any deference to JPC handbooks, rules, or procedures. The
CPUC’s NextG Decision highlights the safety and reliability risks of JPC rules
and their unsupervised function. Analyzing whether the JPC’s role and rules
protect safety requires public transparency about JPC rules and conduct.
In 2015, the CPUC’s SED issued a citation against PG&E for failing to
maintain vegetation near overhead electric lines, a failure that CalFire found
caused the Butte fire in Calaveras and Amador Counties in California on
September 9, 2015.141 Situated in a high fire threat area ranked as Tier 2 fire
risk, the Butte Fire “burned more than 70,000 acres (106 square miles),
destroyed an estimated 921 structures, and resulted in two fatalities” in
September 2015.142
The CPUC updated GO 95 in December 2017 to protect public safety and
promote prompt compliance with the CPUC’s rules by adding protocols and
priority for utility infrastructure in high fire threat areas.143 Following the
devastating wildfires in 2017, the CPUC imposed a 60 month timeline to address
Level 3 risks—defined as an acceptable safety or reliability risk, but a violation
of CPUC GO 95—a category that previously had no set deadline.144 In May
2018, following the destructive 2017 wildfire season that included the Wine
Country and Ventura County fires,145 the CPUC adopted Decision 18-05-042 to
shorten to 36 months the time allowed to address Level 2 safety or reliability

140. CPUC D.17-12-024, supra note 61, at 39.
141. Citation Issued Pursuant to Decision 16-09-055 to Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
Citation # D.16-09-055 E.17-04-001, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 1 (Apr. 25, 2017)
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/News_Room/E1704001
E2015091601Citation20170425.pdf.
142. CPUC D.17-12-024, supra note 61, at 58 n.50.
143. Id. at 2–3.
144. Id. at 2, 4.
145. Richard Gonzales, Scott Neuman & Amy Held, Wildfires in Southern California Force
Thousands of People to Flee, NPR (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/12/05/568511145/wildfires-in-southern-california-force-thousands-to-evacuate.
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issues for utility pole attachments (classified as non-immediate, high to low risk
to safety or reliability).146
The California Department of Fire and Forestry (CalFire) Investigation of the
2017 Wine Country fires found that PG&E infrastructure and operations caused
17 of those fires.147 CalFire found that the Sulfur Fire in Lake County was
caused by utility pole failure, but has provided no public details to date on the
pole failure cause.148 My faculty blog post observed in January 2019 that
“[n]either Cal Fire nor the CPUC’s reports to date have explained why the utility
pole failed in Lake County. Neither have they explained the cause of the electric
distribution issue in the Sonoma County “37fire.”149 My blog recommended the
CPUC “announce its process to examine the cause of these failures and take
immediate steps to make sure they are not replicated” to avoid public safety
threats such as Southern California Edison’s report that it appeared that a
telecommunications lashing wire may have hit an electric line, sparking the
Silverado fire in Orange County, California in October 2020.150 Such analysis
and explanation by the CPUC and CalFire is urgently needed to ensure public
safety as climate change lengthens fire season and ferocious fires threaten public
safety.
Throughout my six-year term as a CPUC Commissioner from January 2011
to January 2017, I highlighted the imperative of CPUC action to promote utility
pole and attachment safety, as well as competition, service reliability,
affordability, access to utility service, and achievement of California’s
146. Decision Approving a Settlement Agreement That Amends Rule 18 of General Order 95,
Decision 18-05-042 (Rulemaking 16-12-001), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 2 (May 31, 2018)
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M215/K830/215830213.PDF.
147. CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Causes Of 12 Wildfires In Mendocino, Humboldt,
Butte, Sonoma, Lake, And Napa Counties, CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF FORESTRY AND FIRE PROT. (June
8, 2018), https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/5100/2017_wildfiresiege_cause.pdf [hereinafter, CalFire
Cause of 12 Fires]; CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Cause of Four Wildfires in Butte and
Nevada Counties, CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF FORESTRY AND FIRE PROT. (May 25, 2018),
http://files.constantcontact.com/fac05d5d601/84b67f87-60c5-489b-ac2c-bc1c33dfd067.pdf;
Investigation Report, Cherokee Fire, CALFIRE (Oct. 8, 2017), http://calfire.ca.gov/
fire_protection/downloads/FireReports/17CABTU015933%20%20Cherokee%20Fire_Redacted.pdf.
148. CalFire Cause of 12 Fires, supra note 147.
149. Catherine Sandoval, Replace Uninsulated and Spliced Electric Wires in High-Wildfire
Danger Areas, and Address the Causes of Transformer and Utility Pole Failures to Protect our
Communities, Professor Catherine Sandoval Blog (Jan. 22, 2019), https://law.scu.edu/faculty/
replace-uninsulated-and-spliced-electric-wires-in-high-wildfire-danger-areas-and-address-thecauses-of-transformer-and-utility-pole-failures-to-protect-our-communities/.
150. Id. Letter from Southern California Edison to CPUC webmaster, Oct. 26, 2020, regarding
Electric Safety Incident Reported- Company Incident No:201026-13677 (regarding the October
2020 Silverado fire in Orange County, California, Southern California Edison reported it “appears
that a lashing wire that was attached to an underbuilt telecommunication line may have contacted
SCE’s overhead primary conductor which may have resulted in the ignition of the fire.”),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/News_Room/NewsUpdates/2020
/Oct%2026%202020%20SCE%20Incident%20Report%20for%20Silverado%20Fire.pdf.
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environmental goals.151 I led several utility pole tours during my service as a
CPUC Commissioner and organized a pole tour in 2018 after rejoining
academia.152 Ivan Penn, writing for the New York Times, described the utility
pole tour I organized in the San Jose, California area in May 2018:
On a recent walking tour in San Jose, the state’s third-most populous
city, a former state regulator showed the issues that are raised when
the wooden poles that hold power lines and communication cables are
not attended to. Some cable lines dangled in front of houses. Workers
had tied some wires to the poles with rope—a violation noted by the
tour’s guides. Power lines ran through thickets of trees to connect to
houses. Some resembled odd Christmas trees, with wires, a street
lamp, a cable box and ropes, all supported by a single pole. And even
with the array of things connected to the poles, some lack proper
support. A wire from one pole along the route had even caused a brush
fire next to a home when it fell to the ground in April. ‘Overloaded
poles have caused wildfires,’ said Catherine Sandoval, the former
regulator who had organized the tour.153
Regulatory, academic, and public scrutiny of JPC standards, rules, and
procedures is critical to public safety as “pegs,” or “buddy poles”—portions of
old poles left attached to new poles—create safety hazards and thwart
competitive access to utility poles.154
CalFire determined that facilities on PG&E’s aging transmission pole, planted
in 1919 when Woodrow Wilson was President of the United States, caused the
Camp Fire that killed 84 people, caused grevious bodily injury to two other
civilians and a fire fighter, and destroyed more than 18,800 structures in and

151. Michelle Waters, Law Professor and Former CPUC Commissioner Catherine Sandoval
to Lead Utility Pole Safety Tour in San Jose, SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (May
17, 2018), https://law.scu.edu/faculty/profile/sandoval-catherine/.
152. See, e.g., Decision Granting Application Subject to Conditions and Approving Related
Settlements, Decision 15-12-005, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n (Dec. 3, 2015) (Sandoval, concurring)
(describing for the proceeding to evaluate the transfer of Verizon’s wireline assets to Frontier
including the eleven workshops held in towns spanning 1,000 miles including utility pole tours.
The proceeding highlighted the need for Verizon to come into compliance with the CPUC’s rules
regarding maintenance of poles, wires, and conduits (General Order 95), and the CPUC’s
operational service rules (GO 133-c), and ordering that compliance); see Catherine Sandoval,
Comments for CPUC Utility Pole Census and Competitive Access Order Instituting Investigation,
17-06-027, California Public Utilities Commission Public Participation Hearing (May 21, 2018),
https://1x937u16qcra1vnejt2hj4jl-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/CPUC-PoleCensus-OII-Professor-Sandoval-presentation.pdf [hereinafter Sandoval, Comments for CPUC
Utility Pole Census OII].
153. Ivan Penn, Power Companies Mistakes Can Cost Billions, Who Pays?, N.Y. TIMES (June
14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/business/energy-environment/california-firesutilities.html.
154. See Sandoval, Comments for CPUC Utility Pole Census OII, supra note 152.
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near Paradise, California in November of 2018.155 PG&E’s February 2019
Securities and Exchange Commission filing disclosed “it is probable that its
equipment will be determined to be an ignition point of the 2018 Camp Fire.”156
PG&E reported “a broken C-hook attached to the separated suspension insulator
that had connected the suspension insulator to a tower arm, along with wear at
the connection point. In addition, a flash mark was observed on [the] Tower,”
which is believed to be the Camp Fire’s ignition point.157 In May 2019, CalFire
confirmed that PG&E’s electrical transmission lines caused the Camp Fire,
California’s deadliest and most destructive fire.158 The magnitude of loss of life
and destruction in the Camp Fire underscores the need for searching analysis of
utility infrastructure governance and management, including examination of
JPC rules and function.
PG&E’s Wildfire Safety Plan filed in February 2019 underscores the
importance of utility poles and the facilities attached to them as drivers of
wildfire risk and safety issues.159 PG&E identified the major drivers of 414 fire
events between 2015-2017 and reported that vegetation contact with conductors
(electric wires) attached to utility poles was the primary wildfire driver, causing
49% of ignitions.160 Conductor failure drove 11% of ignitions; failures of “line
equipment, such as: poles, insulators, transformers, and capacitors” drove 11%
of ignitions; while equipment failure including conductors, splices between
segments of wire, and other connecting hardware drove 5% of ignitions.161 All
of this equipment is attached to utility poles, and pole failures can cause fires
and other hazards.
PG&E’s 2020 GRC application proposed to replace 940 overloaded poles
between 2018 and 2022 at a projected cost of $15.6 million.162 PG&E
Workpapers supporting this proposal did not explain why those poles were
overloaded. PG&E stated that its proposal was “targeting poles that are
155. BUTTE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, THE CAMP FIRE PUBLIC REPORT A
SUMMARY OF THE CAMP FIRE INVESTIGATION, June 16, 2020, 6, 9,
https://www.buttecounty.net/Portals/30/CFReport/PGE-THE-CAMP-FIRE-PUBLICREPORT.pdf?ver=2020-06-15-190515-977.
156. PG&E Corporation Provides Update on Financial Impact of 2017 and 2018 Wildfires;
Reports on Progress of Enhanced Wildfire Safety Inspections Reports Full-Year and FourthQuarter 2018 Earnings, PG&E CORP. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/75488/000119312519055751/d710309dex991.htm.
157. Id.
158. CAL FIRE Investigators Determine Cause of the Camp Fire, CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF
FORESTRY AND FIRE PROT. (May 15, 2019), https://calfire.ca.gov/communications/downloads/
newsreleases/2019/CampFire_Cause.pdf.
159. Pacific Gas and Electric Company Amended 2019 Wildfire Safety Plan, PAC. GAS AND
ELEC. CO. 26 (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.pge.com/pge_global/common/pdfs/safety/emergencypreparedness/natural-disaster/wildfires/Wildfire-Safety-Plan.pdf.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020 General Rate Case Prepared Testimony Exhibit
(PG&E-4) Electric Distribution Chapters 1–10 Volume 1 of 2, 8-20 (Dec. 13, 2018).
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potentially overloaded or significantly degraded and not expected to pass their
next intrusive inspection, based on increasing degradation discovered during the
previous inspection.”163 To address the confluence of high wildfire risk and
overloaded poles PG&E proposed that Tier 3 High Fire Threat District areas “are
the first priority for accelerated retirement, to minimize additional risk of these
poles failing prematurely in-service.”164
PG&E reported to the CPUC in 2018 that most of its utility poles are more
than forty years old.165 In 2018 PG&E had 2.247 million wooden utility poles
in its territory: 979,805 of which were under 40 years old; 1,151,768 were over
40 years old; and PG&E reported that no age information was available for
128,853 wooden poles.166 The life of a distribution pole “is generally considered
to be on the order of 40 years,” according to PG&E’s 2016 GRC testimony. 167
Despite PG&E’s understanding of a distribution pole’s expected life of service,
more than 1.2 million of PG&E’s poles were over 40 years old or lacked any age
information.168
In addition to pole age, pole overloading and maintenance can create safety
and reliability risks. As the CPUC emphasized, “[o]verloaded poles present a
significant safety hazard and reliability risk.”169 The CPUC’s 2015 unanimous
approval of SCE’s GRC in Decision 15-11-021 found that “nearly 19%, of poles
reviewed in SCE’s PLP [Pole Loading Program] study are overloaded, and
specifically failed the bending analysis. The study suggests similar failure rates
in SCE’s total population of poles. SCE proposes to replace these poles.”170
Decision 15-11-021 noted that “3% of poles in the study are overloaded and
could be repaired through addition or repair of guy wires.”171
With increased fire risk in California due to climate change,172 and after more
than 5 years of drought between 2012 and 2016173 which fueled fires through
163. Id. at 8-19.
164. Id.
165. Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s (U39M) Spending Accountability Report,
Application No. 15-09-001, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N B3-44 (March 30, 2018) [hereinafter PG&E
Spending Accountability Report].
166. Id.
167. 2017 General Rate Case Phase II Updated And Amended Prepared Testimony, PACIFIC
GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 5-11 (2016), https://drpwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/PGE09-v1_GRC-2017-PhII_Test_PGE_20161202_396470.pdf.
168. PG&E Spending Accountability Report, supra note 165, at B3-44.
169. 2015 General Rate Case, supra note 107, at 142.
170. Arthur O’Donnell et al., Risk and Safety Aspects of Southern California Edison’s 2018‐
2020 General Rate Case Application 16-09-001, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (2017),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/Safety/Risk_Assessment
/SCE%202018%20GRC%20Report%20Final%20with%20Appendix%20A.pdf.
171. Id.
172. Governor Newsom’s Strike Force, supra note 14, at 1.
173. David Mitchell et al., Building Drought Resilience in California’s Suburbs and Cities,
PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL. 5 (June 2017), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/
R_0617DMR.pdf.
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diseased trees and dry brush even after the drought ended, it is imperative that
the CPUC review JPC roles and rules. The CPUC must examine the JPC
process, its membership rules, unpublished handbooks, and function, and take
appropriate steps to protect public and worker safety.
Lack of public access to JPC rules stymies competitive access, limits
regulatory effectiveness, and creates public safety risks. The Competitive
Telecommunications Association (CALTEL) commented in June 2019 that
most of its members lease pole access and are not joint owners.174 CALTEL
emphasized that “while some of these members may have access to Joint Pole
Association process and procedure documentation, this information is not
publicly available.”175 CALTEL argued that two years after the CPUC opened
the utility pole census and competitive access proceeding “no progress has been
made to improve competitive access to poles and conduits. CALTEL members
continue to face significant delays and excessive costs in ways that both
associations have explained extensively in prior comments.”176
The JPCs’ lack of state or other government supervision creates safety risks
the CPUC, insurance regulators, and California’s legislature and Governor must
evaluate. PG&E’s insurance was insufficient to cover its 2017-2018 liabilities
for fires associated with its infrastructure maintenance and operation.177 Fire
risks have driven up rates for homeowners and businesses in high wildfire
danger areas, leading some companies to cancel homeowner policies.178 JPCs
erect barriers to regulation and utility operation, fueling safety and insurance
risks.
A homeowner can clear the brush near her house to reduce fire risks to her
home. A utility pole wrapped in dead vines stretching into the pole’s electric
space such as a pole I observed in May 2019 in a Tier 3 high wildfire danger
area of Los Gatos, California creates fire, electric, 9-1-1 and communications
access risks a homeowner cannot mitigate. The utility pole tour I organized in
May of 2018 with the CPUC revealed many more examples of poor utility pole
maintenance, safety, and reliability risks in plain view on San Jose, California’s
sidewalks.179
174. Reply Comments of The California Association of Competitive Telecommunications
Companies on ALJ’s Ruling Requesting Comments on Right of Way Rules, CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N 3 (June 24, 2019), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M309/
K755/309755415.PDF [hereinafter CALTEL Reply Comments, ALJ Ruling, ROW].
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Will Wade & Katherine Chinglinsk, PG&E’s $1.4B in Wildfire Insurance May Not Be
Enough, But Was ‘Regular Amount’, Ins. J. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/west/2018/11/20/509843.htm.
178. Sophie Quinton, As Wildfire Risk Increases, Home Insurance Is Harder to Find, PEW
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/01/03/aswildfire-risk-increases-home-insurance-is-harder-to-find.
179. See Sandoval, Comments for CPUC Utility Pole Census OII, supra note 152; Sandoval,
Principles for Utility Regulation in the Face of Increasing Wildfire Risk, supra note 19.
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Utility pole owners and users have a legal duty to address and mitigate safety.
The CPUC, IOUs, JPCs and their members, California’s insurance
commissioner, legislature, and Governor must promptly analyze and address
these risks. That risk analysis should begin with examination of JPC functions
and rules.
The following section analyzes public information about JPC roles and
competitive significance. The CPUC’s request for comment on the JPC’s
function and what, if any, role they should play in a utility pole census and
database, accentuates the CPUC’s lack of supervision over the JPCs.
IV. JPC INCUMBENT VETO RULES ADOPTED BY THE NCJPA DURING THE
CPUC 1998 RIGHTS-OF-WAY PROCEEDING
Our eyes, washed clean of belief180
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles”
A. NCJPA 1998 Agreement Adopts Supermajority Quorum and Voting
Requirements to Consider New Members
During the pendency of the CPUC’s ROW proceeding and prior to the
CPUC’s October 1998 ROW decision, the NCJPA adopted a new agreement in
January 1998 replacing its 1960 “Black Book.”181 The 1998 NCJPA agreement
imposed a supermajority quorum and voting requirement for consideration and
approval of new members.182 NCJPA’s 1998 agreement ensured that
incumbents could exercise veto power over prospective members regardless of
any rules the CPUC adopted to foster competitive access in the ROW
proceeding.
The City and County of San Francisco, a NCJPA member, posted the NCJPA
1998 Agreement on the internet through the City’s Bureau of Public Works.183
The SCJPC articles of incorporation, by-laws, and other governance documents
have not been made public. The JPCs’ lack of non-profit status or government
sanction for their role casts a veil over JPC rules and functions. Utility pole
association members include several investor-owned utilities providing electric
and communications services, local governments, and municipal utility
districts.184 PG&E is a NCJPA member, SCE is a SCJPC member, while San
Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) is not a JPC member.185 JPC members include
180. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS, supra note 1.
181. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, at 1.
182. Id. § 7(a), at 9.
183. Id. at 21.
184. Simms, supra note 21, at 4.
185. Comments Of Southern California Edison Company (U 338-E) On ALJ Mason’s January
31, 2019 Ruling Requesting Comments On The Role Of Joint Pole Associations In Acting As
Clearinghouses For Pole Location, Ownership, Attachment, And Access Information,
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major telecommunications and internet carriers including AT&T, Frontier, and
Comcast, and many CLECs.186 The CPUC’s 2020 decision in the utility pole
census proceeding notes that “SDG&E, SCE, PG&E, Frontier, and AT&T are
the five pole owners who, collectively, own between 85-90% of the 6+ million
electric and communication utility poles in California.”
This Article contends that the NCJPA’s supermajority quorum and voting
requirements, as well as other aspects of the JPC process and function, thwart
the intent of the CPUC’s 1998 ROW decision to promote competitive access to
utility poles. NCJPA and SCJPC member comments to the CPUC indicate that
JPC membership is critical to utility pole access and maintenance necessary to
offer communications and electric service. Analysis of the NCJPA’s quorum
and voting rules, and JPC organizational function, highlight the JPCs’
competitive significance and concerns about their effect on competition, safety,
and reliability.
B. NCJPA Supermajority Quorum and Rules to Consider New Members
To consider and approve a new membership application, NCJPA rules require
a quorum of at least three fourths (3/4) of all the Parties of the Association and
a vote in favor of the motion by at least three fourths (3/4) of all such Parties.187
The absence of enough incumbent members prevents formation of a quorum and
stalls a new member’s application until a quorum is formed. The NCJPA
agreement provides, “[e]ach Party shall have one representative on the
Administrative Board, and each representative shall have one vote.”188
The Association requires that a “[q]uorum must be present before the
Association may conduct official business,” and defines a quorum for the
consideration of new business as representation of at least 3/4 of all the
association’s members.189 A majority vote is only available for matters noticed
10 days in advance of the meeting or if that “same matter was discussed at the
last meeting and is being acted upon as unfinished business at a duly convened
meeting, of the Administrative Board.”190
Per the NCJPA agreement, “[n]o new business may be brought up at a meeting
and finally passed upon at the same meeting unless at least three fourths (3/4) of
Investigation17-06-027, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 2 (Feb. 15, 2019) (“Like other members, SCE
relies on SCJPC records for pole locations, ownership and equity interest information, and the
processing of financial transactions.”) [hereinafter SCE Comments, ALJ Ruling, Pole Census OII];
Comments Of San Diego Gas & Electric Company (U 902 E) On The Role Of Joint Pole
Associations In Acting As Clearinghouses For Pole Location, Ownership, Attachment, And Access
Information, Investigation 17-06-027, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 1 (Feb. 15, 2019); Facts about
PG&E Pole Management and Maintenance, CURRENTS, https://www.pgecurrents.com/2017/
11/08/facts-about-pge-pole-management-and-maintenance/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2017).
186. Simms, supra note 21, at 4.
187. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, § 7(a), at 9.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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all the Parties of the Association are represented and at least three fourths (3/4)
of all such Parties vote in favor thereof.”191 A membership application
constitutes new business, triggering the requirement of a quorum of 3/4 of all of
the parties to the agreement, unless discussed at the previous meeting. New
business requires a vote in favor of admission by 3/4 of the members. The
supermajority quorum and voting requirement pose high barriers to membership
and utility pole access for NCJPA applicants.
NCJPA applies this supermajority standard to proposals to amend its
agreement, including new membership criteria or administrative practices and
policies.
The affirmative vote of at least three quarters (3/4) of the Parties,
which may be by written consent delivered within six (6) months of
the initial action of the Administrative Board on such matter, is
required to amend this Agreement, adopt or modify the By-Laws, or
make changes in the Membership or administrative practices and
policies.192
The requirement for a vote of three quarters of the members to change the bylaws, organization’s agreement, or voting procedure erects high barriers to
making those changes.
CPUC Communications Division staff member Robert Wullenjohn reported
to the CPUC in 2016 that major members of the NCJPA, including PG&E,
AT&T, and NCJPA, agreed to change some of NCJPA’s membership forms to
conform to CPUC eligibility rules for pole attachment.193 Wullenjohn reported
that the NCJPA had difficulty convening a supermajority quorum to hold a vote
to consider changes the utilities’ regulator recommended.194
NCJPA membership is open only to “a Utility which conducts business within
the Operating Boundaries . . .”195 NCJPA’s 1998 agreement defines a utility as:
A governmental or private entity or federally regulated cooperative
which uses poles in the provision of communications, electric power,
transportation or other utility services for sale or resale to the public,
directly or indirectly, and, if a private entity, holds all necessary
federal, state or local authorizations, such as a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”) from the California Public
Utilities Commission (“CPUC”).196

191. Id.
192. Id. § 7(b), at 10.
193. California Public Utilities Commission, Voting Meeting, ADMINMONITOR 2:07:00–
2:17:00 (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.adminmonitor.com/ca/cpuc/voting_meeting/20160929/
[hereinafter CPUC 2016 Voting Meeting, NCJPA Report].
194. Id.
195. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, § 6(A), at 6.
196. Id. § 2(x), at 3.
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NCJPA requires prospective new members to furnish NCJPA with “proof of
federal, state or local authorization, such as a CPCN, if required.”197 NCJPA
also requires new members to have appropriate insurance, agree to the
membership rules upon admission, pay the application fee and assessments, and
“[m]aintain the personnel, equipment and resources necessary for the repair,
maintenance or replacement of its facilities on Jointly Owned Poles or furnish
proof that it has contracted for such services, with an entity or entities approved
by the Administrative Board.”198
NCJPA limits membership to entities licensed by the state or federal
government to offer utility services and occupy pole space.199 These criteria
recognize the threshold role of government regulation in determining who can
occupy utility pole space. Yet, NCJPA’s new membership quorum, voting
requirements, and membership criteria subject prospective pole occupants to
conditions created through incumbent pole owners’ and occupants’ agreement.
NCJPA’s rules and procedures can delay prospective members’ access to
utility poles necessary to deploy competitive services. Delay or failure to grant
JPC membership limits ability to participate in JPC cost and information sharing
and the JPC standard-setting process. The requirement for JPC membership to
access the information and procedures maintained and developed by the JPCs
reveals their competitive significance. Through agreements between incumbent
competitors, JPCs act as gatekeepers to California’s utility pole access market.
The CPUC should promptly examine whether such concerted action by
incumbents is inconsistent with CPUC decisions promoting competitive access,
safety, and reliability. State and federal competition authorities should examine
whether these agreements and JPC functions violate state and federal antitrust
and unfair competition laws.
C. Supermajority Quorum and Voting Requirements for Prospective New
Members Restrict Pole Access, Raising Utility Regulation and Antitrust
Concerns
CPUC rules create a duty for utilities who own utility poles, including
telecommunications companies, to deal with rivals and third-parties the
government deems eligible to attach to utility poles.200 Agreement between
competitors to raise barriers to access for a competitive resource deemed open
to competitors by the regulator raises antitrust concerns under Sherman Act
Section 1 which prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade.201 The CPUC and
197. Id. § 6(B)(4), at 8.
198. Id. §§ 6(a)–(b), at 6–8.
199. Id. § 2(x), at 3.
200. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 709 (1993).
201. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448–50 (2009) (“[I]f a firm
has no antitrust duty to deal with its competitors at wholesale, it certainly has no duty to deal under
terms and conditions that the rivals find commercially advantageous.”); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 401–16 (2004) (where Verizon was required
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the California Attorney General’s Office should examine whether JPC rules and
function are inconsistent with California’s policies to promote competitive
access to utility poles, as well as CPUC safety rules.
Firms with a regulatory duty to deal with competitors cannot escape that duty
by placing assets under the veto power and effective control of an association of
incumbent competitors.
Through competitors’ collective action, JPC
membership rules erect barriers to accessing an asset the utility regulator gives
them permission to use.202 Such conduct limits consumers’ ability to realize
competition’s benefits.
NCJPA’s supermajority voting requirements resemble terms recognized as so
anticompetitive that associations such as the Associated Press and Realty MultiList, Inc. dropped similar terms before a federal antitrust trial.203 Nearly one
hundred years after Samuel Morse first used wooden poles to support telegraph
lines and service,204 the by-laws of the Associated Press faced scrutiny under the
Sherman Antitrust Act adopted in 1890.205 The Associated Press by-laws gave
incumbent members “veto power over the applications of a publisher who was
or would be in competition with the old member,” a veto that could be
overridden only by a vote of four-fifths of all the members.206
The Supreme Court’s 1945 Associated Press v. U.S. decision held that
“arrangements or combinations designed to stifle competition cannot be
immunized by adopting a membership device accomplishing that purpose.”207
Associated Press condemned “restrictive clauses on admissions to membership”
and rules that “prevented service of AP news to non-members.”208
Competitors and firms vying for access to the same critical competitive
resource ̶ utility poles ̶ face the barriers erected by NCJPA’s supermajority
quorum and voting rules. Concerted action to develop and implement those
rules raises questions about whether JPCs have violated Sherman Act § 1
through: (1) a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce in
news among the states, or (2) an attempt to monopolize a part of that trade.
by statute to lease its network elements at wholesale rates, competitor’s allegations of Verizon’s
denial of access to interconnection support services which caused them insufficient assistance
abilities were not a violation under Section 2 of the Sherman Act because Verizon had no antitrust
duty to deal with rival services).
202. Sandoval, Contested Places, Utility Pole Spaces, supra note 55.
203. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1945); United States v. Realty
Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1354, 1358, 1366 (5th Cir. 1980).
204. Mulqueen, A Natural History of the Wooden Utility Pole, supra note 4, at 5 (Morse’s
partners suggested that the quickest way to complete the [Congressionally-funded demonstration
project to construct telegraph service from Washington D.C. to Baltimore] would be to string
telegraph wires overhead on trees and wooden poles.”).
205. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (originally enacted as Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1
(1890)).
206. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 10.
207. Id. at 19
208. Id. at 21.
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NCJPA’s rules do not expressly prevent dealing with non-members as AP’s
rules did. NCJPA rules, however, allow a minority of incumbents to block new
competitors from joining by failing to attend a voting meeting so a quorum is
not formed and the voting requirement for new member admission is not met.
Neither public utility law nor competition law entitle JPCs or its members to
thwart CPUC competitive access policies and safety rules. NCJPA and SCJPC
rules merit scrutiny under state public utility law, federal antitrust and state
competition law that prohibits unfair business practices.209
D. JPCs Lack Non-Profit Status, Are Not Government Agencies, and Are Not
Actively Supervised by the CPUC or Any State Agency
The rules and function of the JPCs have been difficult for non-members and
regulators to discern since the JPCs operating in California are not incorporated
as non-profits whose bylaws and reports are publicly accessible. Neither are the
JPCs government run or supervised. NCJPA’s 1998 Agreement defines the
organization as “[t]he 1998 Northern California joint Pole Association: A nonprofit organization to be formed and supported by the Parties to accomplish the
purposes set forth herein.”210 The City of San Francisco adopted an ordinance
on October 29, 2007 joining the NCJPA’s 1998 agreement.211 That ordinance
described the NCJPA as a “non-profit association of electrical utilities,
telephone companies, cable television providers, irrigation and utility districts,
and municipal utilities whose sole purpose is to administer the shared ownership,
maintenance, use, setting, replacement, dismantling, abandonment or removal
of jointly owned utility poles.”212
More than twenty-three years after the 1998 NCJPA’s agreement’s adoption,
the NCJPA has not submitted a public filing with any state to form a non-profit.
A search of the ProPublica database, the California Secretary of the State’s
Office website, and the California Attorney General’s website in December
2018, September 2019, and June and December 2020, and February 2021 found
no non-profit organizations in the name of NCJPA, nor SCJPC, with or without
abbreviation.213 If JPCs were non-profits their by-laws and other reports would
be publicly available to provide operational transparency and tax-exemption
eligibility.
SCJPC has filed federal taxes for several years, and links to its returns since
2004 are available on the ProPublica database.214 ProPublica reports that SCJPC
209. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16700 (commonly known as the Cartwright Act); CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (prohibiting unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair business acts or practices).
210. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, § 2(b), at 2.
211. Sandoval, Contested Places, Utility Pole Spaces, supra note 55.
212. S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 243-07 § 1(a) (2007), https://www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/
bdsupvrs/ordinances07/o0243-07.pdf.
213. ProPublica NCJPA search finding no such non-profit, supra note 23; Search Query for
Northern California Joint Pole Association, supra note 23.
214. ProPublica Southern California Joint Pole Committee search, supra note 23.
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filed taxes as a non-profit under tax code designation 501(C)(12), applicable to
“irrigation companies, telephone companies, etc., which have a mutually
beneficial nature.”215 Yet, a search of the California Attorney General’s and
California Secretary of State’s Office websites found no non-profit registration
for SCJPC,216 a prerequisite to a non-profit tax exemption for state taxes. The
absence of state non-profit status raises a question about whether the SCJPC
owes California state taxes, or claims some other exemption from filing and
reporting requirements.
No federal or state tax filings were found for NCJPA or under the name of the
Northern California Joint Pole Association through a search of the ProPublica
website on September 9, 2019 and on June 11, 2020, December 26, 2020, and
February 6, 2021.217 Since NCJPA does not appear to be registered as a nonprofit with the State of California, a prerequisite to non-profit tax-exempt status
for California taxes,218 the absence of such filings raises questions about whether
NCJPA owes federal and state taxes.
NCJPA represented itself to the CPUC in March 2017 as a “non-profit
organization formedto [sic] be formed,”219 though the NCJPA had not filed for
non-profit status. NCJPA Interim Operations Manager, Tina Simms stated in
her remarks and PowerPoint presentation in March 2017 at the CPUC workshop
on utility poles that NCJPA was “[a] non-profit organization formedto [sic] be
formed and supported by the Parties [Members] to accomplish the purposes
[Cost Sharing] set forth within the Agreement.”220 Simms’ characterization of
the NCJPA as “formedto [sic] be formed” as a “non-profit organization,”221
raises an issue about whether the NCJPA misrepresented itself before the CPUC
and to the public.

215. Id.
216. Search Results for Southern California Joint Pole Committee, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2020) http://rct.doj.ca.gov/Verification/Web/SearchResults.aspx?
facility=Y; Search Results for Southern California Joint Pole Committee, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY
OF STATE
(2020), https://www.sos.ca.gov/search/?query=southern+california+joint+pole+
committee&search_paths%5B%5D=&search=Search.
217. ProPublica NCJPA search finding no such non-profit, supra note 23; Search Query for
Northern California Joint Pole Association, supra note 23.
218. Annual and Filing Requirements, STATE OF CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD,
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/file/business/types/charities-nonprofits/annual-and-filingrequirements.html (last visited June 11, 2020).
219. Simms, supra note 21, at 6.
220. Id.; see infra Table A.
221. Id.
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This Article recommends the CPUC issue an Order to Show Cause to the
NCJPA and its members to determine whether NCJPA misled the Commission
and the public about its legal status in violation of CPUC Rules of Practice and
Procedure 1.1. That rule requires respect for the CPUC and that those who
appear before the CPUC never “mislead the Commission or its staff by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law.”223 A misrepresentation or artifice to
deceive the CPUC would violate CPUC Rule 1.1. The CPUC should take
appropriate steps to protect the integrity of the Commission’s proceedings and
respect for its rule, orders, decisions, and resolutions.
Simms’ characterization of the NCJPA as “formedto [sic] be formed” as a
“non-profit organization” when it has not applied for or obtained non-profit
status appears to be more than a typo in light of the 1998 Agreement’s statement
that NCJPA will be formed as a non-profit.224 NCJPA may have also
represented itself to the City and County of San Francisco as a non-profit, as
evidenced by San Francisco’s ordinance adopting the 1998 Agreement upon
NCJPA’s insistence that doing so was necessary to maintain membership.225

222. Id.
223. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 20, § 1.1 (“Any person who signs a pleading or brief, enters an
appearance, offers testimony at a hearing, or transacts business with the Commission, by such act
represents that he or she is authorized to do so and agrees to comply with the laws of this State; to
maintain the respect due to the Commission, members of the Commission and its Administrative
Law Judges; and never to mislead the Commission or its staff by an artifice or false statement of
fact or law.”).
224. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, § 2(b), at 2.
225. S.F. ORDINANCE 243-07 § 1(a) (2007), https://sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/
ordinances07/o0243-07.pdf.
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Representing NCJPA as “formedto [sic] be formed as a non-profit” has
competitive significance. Asserted non-profit status may induce public or
private entities to join NCJPA since non-profits have reporting and
accountability mechanisms and do not pay taxes. Municipalities may be
attracted to NCJPA because of the revenues that can be produced by attachers
and deals NCJPA may facilitate. Desire for a municipal revenue source does
not entitle public entities to erect barriers to competition that violate state and
federal antitrust and unfair competition laws, and CPUC rules and policies to
promote competitive utility pole access.
JPC public and private sector members should examine the JPCs’ lack of nonprofit status and the organizations representations about their non-profit status.
Representations about NCJPA’s planned or actual non-profit status may have
been intended to deter more robust oversight of NCJPA and to attract
government and utility members.
Persuading pole owners including municipalities and POUs to join NCJPA
puts utility poles, including those owned by municipal and irrigation district
members, under NCJPA rules including its incumbent member veto rules.
Google was able to gain access to poles in Palo Alto in 2016 when it planned to
deploy Google Fiber because the Palo Alto municipal utility district was not a
NCJPA member.226 In areas where utility poles are put under NCJPA or SCJPC
control, prospective utility pole attachers or owners face the gauntlet of JPC
membership requirements and rules. JPC members who are competitors in the
utility pole access market could delay or block access to IOU or publicly owned
poles by not attending meetings to consider new members or voting to deny
membership.
Several JPC members characterized the organization as producing benefits
such as cost and information sharing and coordinating pole access and
maintenance work.227 Yet, NCJPA membership by municipalities such as the
City and County of San Francisco puts its infrastructure under the veto power of
other NCJPA members and subjects pole access to NCJPA rules that have not
been publicly vetted.
JPC rules to access membership benefits remain opaque, without government
supervision, and without immunity to utility, unfair competition, or antitrust
regulation. The risks to safety and competition JPCs create merits further
analysis under antitrust law and unfair competition law, and CPUC review of
inconsistency between JPCs rules and function and CPUC safety and
competition decisions. The City of San Francisco offered to buy PG&E’s
226. Ethan Baron, Google Fiber Suspended in San Jose and ‘Most’ Other Planned Cities;
Alphabet Unit CEO Quits, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/10/26/google-fiber-suspended-in-san-jose-and-most-otherplanned-cities-alphabet-unit-ceo-quits/ (“Planning in San Jose had advanced to the point that
Google Fiber had in May received final permits for a three-year construction project, to start two
months later in July.”).
227. See discussion infra Section V.
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electric infrastructure assets in the city to increase local control over utility
operations, a proposition PG&E rejected.228 As San Francisco and other areas
served by PG&E evaluate their options following PG&E’s emergence from
bankruptcy in summer 2020, they should examine the role of the NCJPA in
safety and competitive access.
This Article recommends that the California Attorney General’s Office
examine the NCJPA’s representation to the public, the CPUC, prospective and
current members about their non-profit status. Representing itself as a non-profit
“formedto [sic] be formed” as NCJPA did at the CPUC’s March 2017
workshop229 provides false comfort to public entities and the public that NCJPA
operates in a neutral and accountable manner. Those representations may have
induced municipalities and utilities to join NCJPA and put more poles under
NCJPA’s control, rules, and opaque procedures.
The California AG’s Office should determine if NCJPA’s representations
about its alleged impending non-profit status over the past twenty-three years
constitutes an unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practice under California Business
and Professions (“B&P”) Code § 17200.230 NCJPA representations about its
non-profit status despite the lack of any such filing and its rules should also be
examined under the Cartwright Act Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700, which
prohibits unfair competition.
V. THE ROLE OF UTILITY POLE ASSOCIATIONS
They will outlast the elms.231
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles”
A. JPC Roles, Function, and Competitive Significance
As part of the CPUC investigation and rulemaking initiated in June 2017 to
determine whether to order a utility pole census to protect safety and
competition, the CPUC has been examining the function of JPCs.232 In January

228. Reuters, PG&E Turns Down San Francisco’s $2.5 Billion Offer To Buy Assets, CNBC,
Oct. 24, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/pge-turns-down-san-franciscos-2point5-billionoffer-to-buy-assets.html.
229. Simms, supra note 21, at 6.
230. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (prohibiting unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair business
acts or practices).
231. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEM, supra note 1.
232. CPUC Pole Census OII, supra note 10, at 6–7, 41 (“[W]e will consider the question of
pole and conduit management more generally, including (a) rules specifically related to conduit
access; (b) procedures to facilitate data sharing; (c) the role played by the Southern California Joint
Pole Committee (SCJPC) and the Northern California Joint Pole Association (NCJPA) in acting as
a clearinghouse for pole location, ownership, attachment, and access information; and (d) possible
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2019, CPUC ALJ Mason issued a ruling requesting comment on JPC functions
and their role as a clearinghouse for utility pole records.233 Analysis of JPC roles
and risks is important to assessment of JPCs’ competitive significance and effect
on safety and reliability.
JPCs put themselves at the heart of utility pole access, maintenance, and
information markets. The California Appellate Court for the Sixth District noted
in 2018 that “the Northern California Joint Pole Association controlled access to
the utility poles, and access was available only if all of those using the pole
agreed and the pole would not be overloaded by additional equipment.”234
JPC members described the organizations as an “administrator of records
involving the sale and purchase of equity interest, and shared maintenance costs,
in jointly owned poles.”235 As NCJPA’s website states, “[m]embers of the
Association make a voluntary joint undertaking to share expenses regarding
ownership, maintenance, use, setting, replacement, dismantling, relinquishment
or removal of jointly owned poles.”236 NCJPA explains that its function “is to
calculate the values of each transaction based on each year’s authorized costs
agreed upon by all members.”237
PG&E’s characterization of the NCJPA’s role cited the Association’s costsharing function described in the 1998 NCJPA agreement.238 Yet, PGE admitted
in September 2019 that it had written off $3.5 million debts attributable to
NCJPA member AT&T for joint ownership vegetation management and other
expenses due to non-payment, though AT&T had agreed via emails to reimburse
those costs.239 PG&E’s testimony about its $3.5 million write-off of vegetation
management costs it attributed to AT&T calls into question the effectiveness of
adjustments to timelines, responsibilities, and third-party contractor provisions of our ROW
Rules.”).
233. Administrative Law Judge’s Ruling Requesting Comments on the Role of Joint Pole
Associations in Acting as Clearinghouses for Pole Location, Ownership, Attachment, and Access
Information, Investigation 17-06-027 (Rulemaking 17-06-028), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 1–2 (Jan.
31, 2019), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M261/K783/261783011.PDF.
234. Aptos Residents Ass’n v. Cty. of Santa Cruz, 229 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 609, 616 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2018), review denied, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 3884 (Cal. May 23, 2018) (affirming the denial of a
California Environmental Quality Act challenge to Santa Cruz County, California’s decision to
permit deployment of “[D]istributed [A]ntenna [S]ystem[s]” used for mobile telephone service).
235. Reply Comments of Crown Castle Fiber on Administrative Law Judge’s Ruling on The
Role Of Joint Pole Associations In Acting As Clearinghouses For Pole Location, Ownership,
Attachment, And Access Information, Investigation 17-06-027, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 1 (Feb.
25, 2019), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M273/K390/273390827.PDF.
236. About the NCJPA, supra note 6.
237. Id.
238. PG&E, Opening Comments to January 31, 2019 Ruling, Investigation 17-06-027, CAL.
PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 1 (Feb. 15, 2019), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/
G000/M266/K859/266859750.PDF [hereinafter PG&E Comments, ALJ Utility Pole Census OII
Ruling].
239. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, General Rate Case Rebuttal Testimony Exhibit General
Report, 15-1–15-2 (Sept. 4, 2019).
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NCJPA as a cost-sharing facilitator and highlights the need for CPUC
enforcement of vegetation management responsibilities for all joint pole owners
and attachers.
As a member of both the SCJPC and the NCJPA, AT&T informed the CPUC
that “AT&T’s understanding is that neither Association currently acts as a
clearinghouse for pole location, ownership, attachment, or access
information.”240 AT&T characterized the JPCs’ principle function as providing
“a framework for the calculation and sharing of costs and expenses relating to
the sale and purchase of joint pole equity interests. In other words, the
Associations administer joint pole ownership and billing between and among
members.”241
PG&E, as well as NCJPA Interim Operations Manager Simms, described
NCJPA as a “voluntary joint undertaking to share expenses regarding the
ownership, maintenance, use, setting, replacement, dismantling, abandonment
or removal of jointly owned poles.”242 “As such,” PG&E explained, “the
NCJPA retains records of transactions, pole space, and grade owned by its
members, but any pole location, attachment, or access information in the
NCJPA’s records would be quite limited. Thus, PG&E would not characterize
the NCJPA as a ‘clearinghouse’ for such information.”243 CMUA asserted “the
JPAs [Joint Pole Associations] do not obtain, maintain, or provide access to pole
data. Rather, such data and access to this data lies with the individual utilities
that have the data.”244
CMUA further explained that “SCJPC and NCJPA simply administer records
involving the sale and purchase of equity interest in jointly owned poles, and
establish guidelines for pole values and the sharing among owners of authorized
costs.”245 Moreover, “[t]hese guidelines may include agreement on how, what,
and when joint owners may communicate about pole related activity.” 246
Describing the NCJPA and SCJPC role in the sale of pole space, CMUA stated
that “JPAs do not get involved in decisions related to, or the process of, selling
or buying space on poles; JPAs only get involved at the end of transactions at
the point when money is exchanged between parties.”247 NCJPA and SCJPC

240. AT&T Comments on the Role of Joint Pole Associations in Acting as Clearinghouses for
Pole Location, Ownership, Attachment, and Access Information, Investigation 17-06-027
(Rulemaking 17-06-028), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 1–2 (Feb. 15, 2019),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M273/K391/273391841.PDF
[hereinafter
AT&T Comments].
241. Id.
242. PG&E Comments, ALJ Utility Pole Census OII Ruling, supra note 238, at 2 (quoting
NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, at 1); Simms, supra note 21, at 2.
243. PG&E Comments, ALJ Utility Pole Census OII Ruling, supra note 238, at 2.
244. CMUA Comments, supra note 60.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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possess “only that data as is provided by the pole owners necessary for it to
exercise its financial function.”248
SCE argued that the SCJPC “should continue in its current role as an
administrator of records involving the sale and purchase of equity interest in
jointly owned poles and also the agreed upon shared cost of maintenance of
jointly owned poles among its members.”249 SCE “relies on SCJPC records for
pole locations, ownership and equity interest information, and the processing of
financial transactions.”250 SCE argued “[a]ccess information” about poles “is
correctly limited to SCJPC members.”251
At the CPUC’s November 2018 Pole OII Workshop, SCE’s representative
described SCJPC as “essentially just [an] escrow company[y]” that uses paper
records to record utility pole transactions.252 SCE explained that this
“information isn’t easily upload[ed]” as it is recorded in the pole association’s
offices so that “we do not have unique information as to every single type of
attachment whether it was just steel strand, whether it’s fiber optic cable, steel
strand with fiber or steel strand with conductive cable, coax or what have
you.”253
The California Cable and Telecommunications Association (CCTA) stated
that “cable companies typically are not pole owners, and while a cable company
may join the NCJPA to gain access to mapping and related access information,
cable companies generally do not own shares of poles.”254 CCTA reported that
cable companies “typically have entered into pole attachment agreements” with
ILEC “NCJPA members pursuant to Pub. Util. Code § 767.5 and the
Commission’s Rights-Of -Way Decision (D.98-10-058).”255
CLEC ExteNet “places its equipment on jointly owned utility poles through
membership in the Northern and Southern Joint Pole Associations, and through
bi-lateral pole attachment agreements with electric utilities.”256 ExteNet
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
SCE Comments, ALJ Ruling, Pole Census OII, supra note 185, at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
California Public Utilities Commission, Utility Pole Proceeding (I.17-06-027) Workshop,
ADMINMONITOR (Nov. 15-16, 2018), http://www.adminmonitor.com/ca/cpuc/workshop/
20181115/2/.
253. Id.
254. Reply Comments of the California Cable and Telecommunications Association on the
Role of Joint Pole Associations in Acting as Clearinghouses for Pole Location,
Ownership, attachment, and access information, Investigation 17-06-027 (Rulemaking 17-06-028),
CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 2 (Feb. 25, 2019), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/
Efile/G000/M273/K390/273390826.PDF [hereinafter CCTA Reply Comments, ALJ Ruling, Pole
Census].
255. Id.
256. ExteNet Systems (California), LLc (U-6959-C) Comments on Administrative Law Judge’s
Ruling Requesting Comments on the Role of Joint Pole Associations in Actin as Clearinghouses
For Pole Location, Ownership, Attachment, and Access Information, Investigation 17-06-027
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“occasionally places its own poles in the public rights-of-way when there are no
existing utility poles, or existing poles are fully loaded and cannot be replaced
or modified to accommodate additional equipment.”257
The City and County of San Francisco in 2017-2018 analyzed potential
deployment of an Internet fiber backbone to support local gigabit speed
services.258 Parties wishing to attach to utility poles “may become joint owners
or tenants, if the pole owners agree to make space accessible, and allow the party
to purchase an interest in a pole through the [NCJPA],”259 San Francisco’s
Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office noted. That memo observes that many
“utility poles in California are subject to joint ownership arrangements; the
NCJPA has 40 members, including the City and County of San Francisco.”260
San Francisco reported that “[b]esides handling billing issues, the NCJPA has
established procedures and protocols for aspects of joint pole ownership not
addressed by GO 95, such as joint pole planning practice, pole replacement and
removal, identification of poles and attachments for record-keeping
purposes.”261
CMUA argues that SCJPC and NCJPA “serve the interests of their members
and were not established to serve as information clearinghouses for nonmembers who desire access to poles or information about poles.”262 CMUA
urged that the CPUC “must acknowledge that JPAs are governed by their
members, and any obligation accepted by a JPA must be voted on by its
members. Therefore, the Commission could not unilaterally decide to alter the
roles and functions of SCJPC or NCJPA.”263 CMUA characterized NCJPA and
SCJPC as “valuable industry organizations that provide essential services that
reduce costs and administrative burdens for their members.”264
CMUA described JPCs as “voluntary associations comprised of publicly
owned utilities (“POUs”), investor owned utilities (“IOUs”), telephone

(Rulemaking 17-06-028), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 1 (Feb. 15, 2019),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M273/K147/273147229.PDF.
257. Id.
258. See Press Release: Supervisor Mark Farrell Forms Municipal Fiber Blue Ribbon Panel,
MEDIUM (Mar. 14, 2017), https://medium.com/@MarkFarrellSF/press-release-supervisor-markfarrell-forms-municipal-fiber-blue-ribbon-panel-2dccfaf74029. In March 2017-February 2018, I
served as a member of the City’s contemplated development of a fiber backbone network as gigabit
Internet services were not then available to most San Francisco residents.
259. Policy Analysis Report from City and County of San Francisco Budget and Legislative
Analyst’s Office to Supervisor Farrell, 68–69 (Mar. 15, 2016), https://sfbos.org/sites/
default/files/FileCenter/Documents/55322-BLA%20MuniGigabitFiberFinance%20FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter S.F. Policy Analysis Report].
260. Id. at 69.
261. Id.
262. CMUA Comments, supra note 60.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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companies, wireless companies, and cable providers.”265 As CMUA clarified,
“some of these entities are regulated by the [California Public Utilities]
Commission, and some of them are not.”266 CMUA argues the CPUC “does not
have broad generalized authority beyond public utilities, and JPAs, such as
NCJPA and SCJPC, are not public utilities,” and contends that “regulating these
voluntary organizations is outside the scope of the Commission’s authority.”267
CPUC ALJ Miles observed that “NCJPA is comprised of municipalities,
irrigation districts, electric utilities, telephone companies, wireless companies
and cable providers, some of which are entities regulated by the Commission,
and some of which are nonregulated entities.”268
CMUA argues that the CPUC “should not attempt to alter the roles of these
longstanding organizations. Imposing any amount of Commission regulation
over these organization[s] could threaten the very existence of the JPAs and the
vast number of associated agreements between its members.”269 Further,
CMUA argued, “any attempt by the Commission to regulate NCJPA or SCJPC
would set a troubling precedent, potentially exposing any trade or industry group
that involves a public utility to direct regulation by the Commission.”270
NCJPA Interim Operations Manager Simms explained at a CPUC 2017
workshop that each “member has or desires to hold joint equity in utility poles
in and around Northern California.”271 NCJPA describes its mission as
providing “accurate and timely pricing for all joint pole transactions while
providing ongoing support, ensuring a seamless experience for all joint pole
member companies.”272 NCJPA calculates “the values of each transaction based
on each year’s authorized costs agreed upon by all members. At the end of each
month, the Association prepares monthly Bills of Sales (Form 44) by which each
member can then make their monetary settlement.”273 To do so, NCJPA
maintains “records, for the work connected with recording and pricing of
transactions for the joint use of poles and their appurtenances” and prepared
“Assessments, Bills of Sale (Form 44) to members, and related joint use
activities.”274
NCJPA performs “the pricing and billing of physical construction work as
directed by the constructing utility and in accordance with the Routine
Handbook.”275 The Association also reacts to “[j]oint Pole billing information
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
Id.
Id.
CPUC Final Arbitrator’s Report, Crown Castle PG&E Arbitration, supra note 7, at 2 n.5.
CMUA Comments, supra note 60.
Id.
Simms, supra note 21, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 11.
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provided by member(s) on Routine Handbook Forms 2, 7, 44, 48–submission of
one of these Forms triggers an NCJPA pricing or billing update to the Friend
database” which contains information about pole locations, ownership, and
features.276
NCJPA effectively acts as a private standard setting organization (SSO)
outside of the purview of CPUC rulemaking or review. Simms reported to the
CPUC that through its committees NCJPA adopts standards designed to promote
utility pole safety and reliability.277
This private standards-setting role
increases the JPCs’ competitive significance.
The Supreme Court recognized in Allied Tube v. Indian Head, Inc., that
standards adopted through an association’s process that undermine competition
can disadvantage competitors, erect barriers to competition and service, and add
costs.278 Utility pole attachment, maintenance, and other standards adopted
outside of the CPUC’s purview pose risks to public safety and reliability and
erect competitive barriers.
Lack of CPUC review of JPC rules and standards highlights the safety gap
created by JPC private standard-setting. Electric and communications wires,
antennas, transformers, and other assets that may pose safety risks and are
necessary to competitive service, attach to utility poles JPCs have made subject
to their rules. Fire and utility infrastructure safety, reliability, and competition
risks demand rigorous analysis of JPC rules, roles, risks, function, and conduct.
B. The Competitive Significance of the JPCs Function, Structure, and
Membership Rules to Competition, Safety, and Reliability
Comments submitted to the CPUC about JPCs’ function, CPUC workshops,
the NCJPA Agreement, and other public documents indicate that JPCs perform
five main competitive and safety functions. JPCs facilitate: 1) utility pole space
sales by providing members with cost calculation and information; 2) sharing of
“expenses regarding the ownership, maintenance, use, setting, replacement,
dismantling, abandonment or removal of jointly owned poles”279; 3) sharing
utility pole information including “mapping and related access information”280
276. Id.
277. See AT&T Panel 2 Presentation, CPUC Pole Safety En Banc Panel 2, 5 (April 28, 2016),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/Safety/
Utility%20Pole%20En%20Banc%20Agenda%20030716.pdf
(“NCJPA/SCJPC
[Southern
California Joint Pole Committee] requirements are more stringent than but not contradictory with
GO 95 rules in some areas. For example, for electric lines exceeding 60 KV, NCJPA Routine
Handbook: Safety Factor of 4.0, GO 95 requires a minimum Safety Factor of 2.67.”).
278. CPUC Competition OII Decision 16-12-025, supra note 8, at 181 (citing Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509 (1988) (observing that for standards-setting
organizations “hope of procompetitive benefits depends upon the existence of safeguards sufficient
to prevent the standard‐ setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in
restraining competition.”)).
279. Id.; NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, at 1.
280. CCTA Reply Comments, ALJ Ruling, Pole Census, supra note 254, at 2.
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about “pole locations, ownership and equity interest information;”281 4)
calculating and sharing information about maintenance or compliance costs,282
and; 5) establishing standards through procedures members observe for the
conduct of pole work as described in the unpublished “Agreement and
Operations Handbook” and other documents.283
JPCs limit information exchange, cost sharing, standard-setting development
and access to JPC members. Neither prospective members who compete with
JPC members for pole space and to offer a range of services, nor regulators have
had ready access to information JPCs gather and guard.
JPC development of utility pole and attachment procedures and standards
outside of the CPUC’s review raises safety risks. The CPUC’s 2013 approval
of the settlement regarding the Malibu Canyon Fire stated that reliance on
SCJPC procedures does not create a defense to violations of GO 95 or other
CPUC rules.284
CPUC ALJ Miles’ Arbitrator’s Report on the Crown Castle-PG&E Pole
ownership access dispute concludes that “although PG&E and Crown Castle
voluntarily participate in the Northern California Joint Pole Association
(NCJPA), we [the CPUC] are not required to give deference to the provisions of
agreements, policies or procedures of that association.”285 CPUC further
explained that “[t]ransactions concerning the sale or lease of utility property
(such as the transaction at issue between PG&E and Crown Castle here), are
already within the Commission’s jurisdiction under Public Utilities Code
Section (Pub. Util. Code §) 851.286
NCJPA’s stated purpose, CPUC ALJ Miles notes, “is to share expenses
regarding the ownership, maintenance, use, setting, replacement, dismantling,
abandonment or removal of jointly owned poles.”287 CPUC ALJ Miles adds that
“the NCJPA Agreement and the NCJPA Operations Handbook go beyond
accounting for expenses and deal with many terms and conditions of joint pole
transfer and usage.”288 The CPUC’s report on the history of utility poles states
that the SCJPC Handbook contains procedures and protocols for issues such as:
“1) Joint pole planning practice; 2) Pole replacement; 3) Transferring,
rearranging, or changing facilities; 4) Removal, abandonment, or relinquishment
of a pole; 5) Rights of way; 6) Correcting the record or cancelling a joint pole
agreement; and 7) Identification of poles and attachments for record-keeping

281.
282.
283.
8–9.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

SCE Comments, ALJ Ruling, Pole Census OII, supra note 185, at 2.
Id. at 1–2.
CPUC Final Arbitrator’s Report, Crown Castle PG&E Arbitration, supra note 7, at 2,
See CPUC NextG Settlement, 2007 Malibu Canyon Fire, supra note 134, at 7.
CPUC Final Arbitrator’s Report, Crown Castle PG&E Arbitration, supra note 7, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2 n.5.
Id.

518

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 69.3:1

purposes.”289 These standard-setting and record-keeping procedures require
antitrust and unfair competition analysis, and examination for their consistency
with CPUC safety, reliability, competition, and other regulations.
CPUC ALJ Miles recommended that “if NCJPA is going to continue to
facilitate sale and purchase transactions pertaining to public utility poles among
its member entities,” the CPUC should “require NCJPA to submit (before
implementation) for Commission review and approval under Pub. Util. Code §
851, its agreements, forms, procedures and handbooks which concern the
transfer, sale, lease, assignment, mortgage, or encumbrance of public utility
poles.”290 She added that “[s]uch transactions, which are being handled by
NCJPA on behalf of its members, are clearly within the Commission’s
jurisdiction.”291
California Public Utilities (CA PU) Code 313 allows the CPUC plenary access
to utility records. The CPUC can order utilities and entities under the
Commission’s jurisdiction to produce records of correspondence with the JPC
and their members.
In addition to safety functions, the information and cost-sharing functions that
JPCs perform are important to competition. CCTA reported that although its
cable company members generally lease rather than buy utility pole space,
CCTA members join the NCJPA and SCJPC to “gain access to mapping and
related access information.”292 CMUA’s characterization of the JPCs as
“valuable industry organizations that provide essential services that reduce costs
and administrative burdens for their members”293 underscores the competitive
advantages JPCs give to their members. JPC information, cost-sharing, and
technical functions mediate access to competition, cost-competitiveness, and
utility safety and reliability.
JPCs’ role in “calculation and sharing of costs and expenses relating to the
sale and purchase of joint pole equity interests,”294 raises questions about
whether JPCs erect barriers to competition authorized in the 1998 ROW
agreement and subsequent CPUC decisions. Mulqueen’s report for the CPUC’s
Policy and Planning Division providing an introduction to utility poles states
that “[p]arties wishing to become joint owners may purchase an interest in a pole
through the Northern California Joint Pole Association (NCJPA) or the Southern
California Joint Pole Committee (SCJPC), which track ownership of and activity
on jointly owned poles and invoice members for their activities.”295 No CPUC
decision requires prospective pole owners to conduct those transactions through

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Mulqueen, Brief Introduction to Utility Poles, supra note 2, at 12–13.
CPUC Final Arbitrator’s Report, Crown Castle PG&E Arbitration, supra note 7, at 9.
Id.
CCTA Reply Comments, ALJ Ruling, Pole Census, supra note 254, at 2.
CMUA Comments, supra note 60, at 3.
AT&T Comments, supra note 240, at 2.
Mulqueen, Brief Introduction to Utility Poles, supra note 2, at 12.
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the JPCs. Mulqueen’s report highlights the JPC practice of serving as an
intermediary to complete those transactions.296
JPC membership appears to be open to pole space renters such as members of
CCTA. Mulqueen reported that renters authorized to attach facilities to utility
poles may “lease space from a pole owner without purchasing an interest in the
pole. Pole owners perform the necessary pole loading calculations to determine
whether it is safe for a Renter to attach to a pole; SCE reports that it has 160
active renters on its poles” as of 2014.297
Southern California Edison (SCE) stated in 2016 that “California’s electric
utilities have established processes for other parties to obtain access to poles,
including joint pole entities.”298 SCE clarified that 70% of Southern California
Edison (SCE) poles are joint use, which does not equate to jointly owned.299 It
is not clear whether poles that are not jointly owned, but may interconnect to
jointly owned poles, are also subject to JPC information and cost-sharing,
standards, or procedures.
Based on JPC member descriptions,300 JPC membership is a substantial
competitive advantage in the utility pole ownership and maintenance market.
JPC functions such as its standards setting process and administration implicate
the CPUC’s safety jurisdiction. JPC functions, rules, and risks require
immediate review as California works to mitigate climate change, wildfire
danger, and public safety risks.
VI. INFRASTRUCTURE ACCESS, GOOGLE AND THE CPUC FACE THE NCJPA
SUPERMAJORITY QUORUM AND NEW MEMBER VOTING REQUIREMENTS
Lift incredulous to their fearsome crowns of bolts, trusses, struts, nuts,
insulators, and such Barnacles as compose…301
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles”
A. Google and the CPUC Confront JPC Membership Barriers
Google’s attempts to join the NCJPA in 2014-2016 as part of its efforts to
provide Google Fiber service in California including in San Jose, California’s
third largest city and the tenth largest city in America, highlight the competitive

296. See id. at 12–13, 23.
297. Id. at 13.
298. The State of Utility Poles in California, CPUC Utility Pole Safety En Banc, (Apr. 28,
2016),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/Safety/SCE%
20Panel%201%20UPDATED%20VERSION%20%20Utility%20Pole%20Safety%20En%20Ban
c%20-%20SCE%20Panel%201%20(160425E).pdf.
299. 2015 General Rate Case, supra note 107, at 103.
300. S.F. Policy Analysis Report, supra note 259, at 60.
301. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS, supra note 1.
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barriers erected by the NCJPA’s membership rules.302 CPUC Decision 15-05002 determined in 2015 that Google is a franchised Video Service Provider
(VSP) that transmits television programs by cable to subscribers for a fee and
thus is a cable television corporation that has a right to access utility
infrastructure under CA PU Code 767.5 such as utility poles.303
Google’s Communications Law Director, Austin Schlick, complained to the
CPUC that the NCJPA’s rules created barriers to building Google Fiber service
through utility pole access.304 As Schlick stated, “[g]aining access” to utility
infrastructure “in a timely manner,” “bears on Google Fiber’s decisions whether
to build new networks, as well as enables it to serve customers more quickly.”305
The CPUC Communications Division staff reported in September 2016 that
NCJPA was having trouble convening a quorum of three-quarters of the
members to vote on Google’s membership application to facilitate its pole access
and deployment of Google Fiber.306 At the CPUC’s September 29, 2016
Commission Voting Meeting, I stated that as a Commissioner “who’s also an
antitrust law professor, I’m really concerned about . . . whether the rules are
sufficiently pro- competitive. . . . [W]e want to encourage competition and
choice, and we expect the pole safety committees to respect and facilitate
that.”307 I concluded, “I would also urge the [utility pole] committees to also not
force us to go down the enforcement route.”308 CPUC Commissioner Randolph
stated at that meeting,
If we are going to meet the policy goals of ensuring broadband and
ensuring competition and customer choice, entities are going to need
to be able to attach, they’re going to need to be able to attach safely

302. Joe Rodriguez, San Jose Officially Becomes 10th Largest City, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS (Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.mercurynews.com/2011/03/24/san-jose-officially-becomes10th-largest-city/; Baron, supra note 226.
303. CPUC Decision 15-05-002, supra note 80, at 39–41 (finding that “Google Fiber Inc. is a
state-franchised VSP,” concluding that a “state-franchised VSP that transmits television programs
by cable to subscribers for a fee is a ‘cable television corporation’ as defined by Pub. Util. Code §
216.4,” and determining as a conclusion of law that “[a]n entity that has dual status as a statefranchised video service provider under Public Utilities Code Section 5800 et seq., and a cable
television corporation under Section 216.4, may access public utility infrastructure as a cable
television corporation in accordance with Section 767.5 and the right-of-way Rules.”).
304. See Letter from Austin Schlick, Director, Communications Law, Google Inc., to Dr.
Timothy Sullivan, Executive Director, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 2 (Feb. 5, 2016),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/Utilities_and_Industries/
Communications_-_Telecommunications_and_Broadband/Service_Provider_Information/Video_
Franchising/Google%20Fiber%20Letter%20to%20Executive%20Director.pdf [hereinafter Schlick
letter to CPUC, Feb. 5, 2016].
305. Id. at 2.
306. CPUC 2016 Voting Meeting, NCJPA Report, supra note 193, at 2:07:00–2:17:11.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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and they’re going to need to be able to attach in an expeditious
manner.309
Google announced in October 2016 that it was slowing deployment of Google
Fiber.310 To date, Google has not constructed fiber service in San Jose,
California and many other cities where it had envisioned expansion. Google
estimated that to deploy fiber for high-speed Internet in San Jose, “60 percent of
its [fiber] cable would be underground and 40 percent aerial,” the later
depending on access to utility poles.311 NCJPA membership association rules
and conduct may have lengthened time to market and erected hurdles to
competition.
Google sought to become an NCJPA member and to own utility poles space
to deploy Google Fiber.312 The CPUC’s Competition OII Decision noted that
“AT&T in May, 2015 announced that it was discontinuing its practice in
Northern California of buying space on a pole for third-party attachers when
AT&T itself did not own sufficient surplus space on that pole to accommodate
the attacher.”313 Although “AT&T has a 2014 agreement with Google that
allows the Internet giant to access AT&T poles anywhere in the U.S.,”314 for
poles not solely owned by AT&T and subject to the NCJPA’s management,
NCJPA membership was critical for Google’s pole access. As the East Bay
Times reported, “[i]n San Jose, where Google and city officials are actively
planning for citywide fiber rollout, the pole association controls most utility
poles and only members can access those, according to Michael Liw, the city’s
deputy director of public works.”315
PG&E spokesperson Tamar Sarkissian said that while its “agreement with
Google provides access to PG&E poles, we have discussed with Google it needs
to contact the communications utility for access to jointly owned poles.”316
PG&E’s statement indicates that utility pole owners such as PG&E made JPCs
an intermediary for access to the utility pole ownership, access, and maintenance
market.
CPUC Communications Division staff member Robert Wullenjohn reported
at a Commission voting meeting about the importance of NCJPA membership
to the pole attachment process and the provision of competitive communications

309. Steven Blum, Cable, Telcos Use Monopoly Muscle to Block Access to California Poles,
STEVEN BLUM’S BLOG (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.tellusventure.com/blog/cable-telcos-usemonopoly-muscle-to-block-access-to-california-poles/.
310. Baron, supra note 226.
311. Id.
312. Blum, supra note 309.
313. CPUC Competition OII Decision 16-12-025, supra note 8, at 114 (citation omitted).
314. Ethan Baron, Google Fights AT&T, Comcast Over Google Fiber Service, EAST BAY
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2016/03/11/google-fights-att-comcastover-google-fiber-service/ [hereinafter Google Fights AT&T].
315. Id.
316. Id.
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services.317 NCJPA “Association members are able simply to purchase pole
space for their attachments themselves, rather than going through a much more
complicated leasing and contract process,” he explained to the Commission
Voting Meeting.318 Wullenjohn continued, “[m]embership in the [NCJPA]
would allow companies like Google to bypass difficulties in the leasing process
that have been impossible to surmount in the three or four months that CD has
been trying to facilitate the process.”319
As the East Bay Times reported, “Google’s plan to bring ultrahigh-speed
Internet service to the Bay Area has run into a decidedly non-tech hurdle: utility
poles” and in order to “roll out Google Fiber in five Silicon Valley cities, the
tech giant needs access to the poles for stringing up fiber cable. But in several
cities a who’s who of Google competitors are standing in the way.”320 By
contrast, in Palo Alto, California, “the pole association controls only 5 percent
of the utility poles. Some 90 percent are jointly owned by the city and AT&T.
‘No problems to report,’ city spokesperson Catherine Elvert said, regarding the
city’s work with the two companies on Google Fiber pole access.”321
A municipality’s or irrigation district’s decision to join NCJPA or SCJPA
brings their utility pole assets within the governance of JPC rules. NCJPA
governance creates an effective member veto that allows incumbents to block or
delay access by failing to forum a quorum or approve a new member. Neither
do NCJPA rules require any public explanation, or communication of
information to the proposed member, attacher, or the CPUC, about the reasons
for failing to forum a quorum or approve a new member’s application.
JPCs erected these requirements despite the CPUC’s 1998 Row Decision and
subsequent CPUC decisions to promote competitive access to utility poles for
attachers. The CPUC determines who is qualified to attach to utility poles and
maintains its safety jurisdiction over utility poles, overhead lines, and
underground facilities. JPCs intermediate the CPUC’s regulatory function.
Google Fiber’s February 5, 2016 letter to the CPUC stated “PG&E and the
Northern California Joint Pole Association were ‘resisting their duty of
providing nondiscriminatory access’ afforded under D.15-05-002.”322 Google
alleged that video service providers “like Google Fiber continue to be excluded
from membership from the Northern California Joint Pole Association if they do
not possess a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN),”323
despite the CPUC’s 2015 Decision 15-05-002 authorizing VSPs utility pole
317. CPUC 2016 Voting Meeting, NCJPA Report, supra note 193.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Baron, supra note 314.
321. Id.
322. CPUC Competition OII Decision 16-12-025, supra note 8, at 113.
323. Comments of Google Fiber Inc. On Proposed Decision of ALJ Bemesderfer, Investigation
15-11-007, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 8 (Nov. 5, 2015), docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/
G000/M169/K916/169916572.PDF.

2020]

Utility Pole Association Rules, Roles, and Risks

523

access. Google continued, “because state-franchised VSPs do not need a CPCN
to deploy infrastructure in the public rights of way or to offer service to
consumers, this membership requirement lacks any reasonable basis for these
providers.”324
Google’s membership application could not be approved under NCJPA’s
rules without a supermajority quorum to consider and approve a new member
application. As Google argued, “[u]tilities should not be able to use their own
internal policies or joint associations to avoid obligations to provide access to
infrastructure and thereby delay deployment of competitive broadband
infrastructure.”325 Google argued that “utilities obligated to provide access
should not be allowed to avoid those obligations by establishing unreasonably
slow or cumbersome working arrangements with other utilities that are involved
in pole-access processes, or by failing to establish arrangements that are needed
to effectuate third parties’ access rights.”326
Neither the CPUC nor any statute authorize the JPCs or their members to
make JPC membership a threshold for utility service offering and competition
that requires utility pole access. As an agreement among competitors for utility
pole access necessary for increasingly convergent and co-dependent
communications and electric services, the JPCs and their members are subject
to state and federal antitrust and unfair competition laws.
B. CPUC Jurisdiction Over Disposition of Utility Assets
California law confers on the CPUC authority to determine whether to
approve the disposition of a utility asset. California Pub. Util. Code § 851
requires a CPUC order to approve the sale, lease, assignment, mortgage, or
encumbrance of utility assets valued at $5 million or more.327 California PU
Code 851 prohibits disposition of utility assets valued under $5 million unless
the Commission approves that transaction through the CPUC’s Advice Letter
process, following staff-level review and recommendation, or, for uncontested
advice letters, the CPUC’s Executive Director or the appropriate division
director issues such an approval.328
No CPUC order has granted the NCJPA or SCJPC or its members exemption
from the CPUC’s requirements for approval of the disposition of utility assets.
The 1998 NCJPA agreement describes Appendix A as “Commission
confirmation that § 851 does not apply,” though no such document is posted in
the NCJPA agreement available through the City of San Francisco website.329
No such Commission documentation of an NCJPA § 851 exemption is available

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7–8.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 851 (1951).
Id.
NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, at 19.
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in the public record. Even if a CPUC staff member had issued such a letter in
1998 or earlier, it would not hold the weight of a Commission order or decision.
No CPUC order, decision, or resolution relieves regulated utilities of the duty to
comply with the CPUC’s statutory asset transfer approval process under CA PU
Code 851.
The CPUC should issue a data request to the utilities it regulates who are
NCJPA and SCJPC members to ask if they have transferred assets through the
JPC without first obtaining CPUC approval. Records kept by JPC members and
JPCs can facilitate analysis of whether utility assets have been disposed of
through JPCs without CPUC approval. California law grants the CPUC with
authority to ask for and inspect utility records and facilities under Cal. Pub. Util.
Code § 313 and § 314(a).330
Failure to comply with CA PU Code § 851 should be identified and the CPUC
should determine whether any penalty or remedy is appropriate if CPUC
authorization was not obtained prior to transfer. The JPC’s role in the utility
asset sale process underscores the need for CPUC analysis of whether JPCs and
their members operate in accordance with CPUC rules and California law.
VII. NETWORK EFFECTS OF UTILITY POLE JOINT MANAGEMENT AND
REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE ACCESS AND SAFETY
These weathered encrustations of electrical debris331
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles”
Communications and electricity are classic network industries that become
more valuable as more people connect and additional facilities are built to
support a range of services. Statutes adopted to promote expansion of telegraph
and telephone networks reflect universal service objectives “founded on the
concept that all subscribers to a telephone company’s basic service network
benefit when another person joins that network. Therefore, the entire network
is more valuable because of the addition of the new subscriber.”332
Regardless of the device through which we connect to communications,
video, or electric services, the infrastructure supporting those services is
composed of a vast, interconnected network of utility poles, wires, conduit, and
other physical facilities. Utility poles form the scaffold that supports the wires,
antenna, power sources, and means of power distribution and transmission

330. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 313, 314 (1951).
331. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS, supra note 1.
332. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. AT&T Commc’ns of Southwest, 777 S.W.2d 363, 372 (Tex. 1989)
(Mauzy, J., concurring) (quoting Tex. Alarm & Signal Ass’n v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 603 S.W.2d
766, 770 (Tex. 1980)).
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services. This platform enables communications, cable, Internet and electric
services that power our modern economy, democracy, and way of life.333
Utility pole associations share many characteristics of a network joint venture,
but NCJPA’s 1998 agreement section 21 states that it is not a joint venture or
partnership.334 Utility pole joint use with CPUC authorization and oversight,
could reduce costs, increase competition and service deployment, and promote
safety and reliability. For these reasons, the California legislature adopted laws
in 1915, updated in 1951, allowing the CPUC to order joint use of utility poles
with appropriate compensation.335 Sharing costs of accessing and maintaining
utility poles reduces capital and operations costs, burdens on communities from
multiple poles, and enables the provision of a variety of consumer services at
lower costs than if the network had to be duplicated.336
State policy to promote joint pole use reduces burdens on rights-of-way that
cross communities, towns, rural areas, and forests by limiting the need to build
additional infrastructure. A utility pole access and management process that
favors incumbents and thwarts regulatory supervision undermines competition,
innovation, public service, and safety.
The CPUC, not the pole association, determines the legal right to access poles
and the standards for utility infrastructure maintenance.337 CPUC rules curb the
trader, or utility pole owner’s freedom to choose with whom to deal. The
Supreme Court under United States v. Colgate & Co., recognized that absent an
anticompetitive purpose, federal antitrust law does not limit a trader’s freedom
to choose with whom to deal.338 CPUC rules delineate the type of entity,
licensee, or authorization holder who has a legal right to utility pole access.339
CPUC Decision 98-10-058 requires pole owners to deal with competitors who
wish to buy or lease pole space (subject to certain technical and safety limitations
and CPUC decisions about who can attach).340 The CPUC’s decisions eliminate
a potential antitrust defense running from Colgate through Trinko to Linkline
that limits the duty of competitors to deal with rivals.341
333. See Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Energy Access is Energy Justice: The Yurok Tribe’s
Trailblazing Work to Close the Native American Reservation Electricity Gap, in ENERGY JUSTICE:
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 166, 206 (Raya Salter et al. eds., 2018) (“Grid-electricity
access will enable Internet and communications buildout as they are interconnected infrastructures
increasingly dependent on electricity.”).
334. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, at 18.
335. An Act to Provide for the Organization of the Railroad Commission, ch. 91, § 41, 1915
Cal. Stat. 136; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 767.
336. Pole Attachments 101, EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE 5, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/
file/7020708245.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
337. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 767.
338. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
339. CPUC Decision 98-10-058 or ROW Decision, supra note 73, at 2.
340. Id.
341. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’n, Inc., 555 US 438, 448 (2009) (“As a general
rule, businesses are free to choose the parties with whom they will deal, as well as the prices, terms,
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Brett Frischmann and Spencer Weber Waller note that the Supreme Court’s
Verizon v. Trinko 2004 opinion states that “essential facility claims should be
denied where a state or federal agency has effective power to compel sharing
and to regulate its scope and terms.”342 They argue that a “viable essential
facilities doctrine of necessity exists in the vast economic canyon between fully
competitive markets and fully regulated ones. Fully regulated markets come
with extensive regulatory oversight and accompanying antitrust immunities.”343
The CPUC’s lack of direct regulation of JPCs indicates that the market is not
so comprehensively regulated as to confer antitrust immunities under Trinko.344
Neither does the CPUC actively supervise utility pole associations and adopt a
policy of displacing competition as required under Phoebe Putney to confer
antitrust immunity.345 The CPUC has a policy to promote competition, not to
displace it.
Trinko is a Sherman Act Section 2 case alleging that the telephone company
defendant abused or attempted to abuse monopoly power.346 For JPCs,
supermajority voting rules for prospective new members, their agreements about
information and cost sharing, their standard setting with no oversight, and other
aspects of their function raise concerns about harms to competition from
competitors’ concerted action. This Article urges antitrust and unfair
competition law analysis of California JPC rules and roles to examine potential
Sherman Act Section 1 violations involving agreements between competitors
that harm competition.
Analysis of the JPCs’ potential pro- and anticompetitive benefits and harms
under antitrust and unfair competition law is beyond this article’s scope. Such
an analysis should examine any benefits in the context of the NCJPA agreement
which says it is not a joint venture, distinguishing it from other cases that argued
the joint venture’s benefits merited rule-of-reason standard of review.347

and conditions of that dealing.”); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 411 (2003); Colgate Co., 250 U.S. at 307 (“In the absence of any purpose to create
or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.”).
342. Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 7 (2008) (quoting Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004)).
343. Id. at 18.
344. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (“essential facility claims should be denied where a state or federal
agency has effective power to compel sharing and to regulate its scope and terms.”). See also Pac.
Bell, 555 U.S. at 448–50.
345. See infra Section VIII (discussing state supervision under F.T.C v. Phoebe Putney Health
Sys., 568 U.S. 216, 233 (2013)).
346. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
347. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, at 18. Cf. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) (“Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also not usually
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Comments submitted to the CPUC indicate that JPCs create non-price barriers
to competition that may raise rivals’ costs,348 and affect utility service
affordability.
NCJPA rules allow incumbents to raise rivals’ costs through delayed voting,
not voting, or a no vote, even when the rival is authorized by the CPUC to have
access to utility poles.349 This process tends to decrease output, reducing the
supply and range of services offered competitors offer. Such concerted action
decreases and delays competition, contrary to the State of California’s policy to
promote competition in the communications field. NCJPA’s membership rules
erect hurdles that give incumbents effective veto power over new members.
Antitrust law has long condemned this type of concerted agreement, leading
the organizations in Associated Press350 and Realty Multi-List to drop several
provisions in their agreements before their antitrust trials began.351 The CPUC
and competition authorities should not allow JPCs and their members to raise
rivals’ costs, deter competition, or create and maintain safety and reliability
risks. Antitrust law, unfair competition law, and public utility law should not
countenance barriers to competition unduly erected through agreements between
incumbent competitors.
VIII. STATE ACTION ANTITRUST EXEMPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO NCJPA
SUPERMAJORITY VOTING REQUIREMENTS
True, their thin shade is negligible,
But then again there is not that tragic autumnal
Casting-off of leaves to outface annually.352
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles”
A. The Legal Standard for the State Action Immunity Doctrine
Immunity from federal antitrust liability under the State Action Doctrine
requires both a state policy to displace competition and active supervision by the
state. The state must articulate a purpose for its program that supplants
competition, intent to displace competition, and actively supervise the

unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to market
the product at all.”).
348. See CALTEL Reply Comments, ALJ Ruling, ROW, supra note 174 , at 3.
349. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
267, 267–70 (1983) (describing raising rivals’ costs as a non-price predation theory including
strategic limitation of rivals’ inputs that shifts out the demand facing the predator). Cf. Steven C.
Salop & David T. Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 19, 19 (1987).
350. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 5, 6, 13, 14, 21, 22 (1945).
351. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1358, 1366–67 (5th Cir. 1980).
352. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS, supra note 1.
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program.353 When it applies, “[t]he doctrine of state action immunity exempts
some state policies, legislation, and regulatory programs from federal antitrust
liability on federalism and state sovereignty grounds.”354
The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in North Carolina State Bd. of Dental
Examiners v. F.T.C. recognizes that since the Court’s 1943 Parker v.
Brown355 decision, federal antitrust laws have been interpreted “to confer
immunity on anticompetitive conduct by the States when acting in their
sovereign capacity.”356 The Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown noted, “[w]e
find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature.”357
The Court “has repeatedly held that the grant of power to Congress by the
Commerce Clause did not wholly withdraw from the states the authority to
regulate the commerce with respect to matters of local concern, on which
Congress has not spoken.”358 Congress’ purpose to respect the federal balance
and to “embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States
possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution”359
underlays the state action immunity doctrine from federal antitrust law. To
qualify for state action immunity, “the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’” and “the policy must be
‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.”360 The Court has declined to find stateaction immunity where the state did not have a “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed” state policy “designed to displace unfettered business
freedom . . . .”361

353. Justice v. Town of Cicero, 577 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39 (1985)) (“Under the Parker doctrine, the actions of
municipalities fall outside the reach of the federal antitrust laws if the municipality can
‘demonstrate that [its] anticompetitive activities were authorized by the State ‘pursuant to state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.’”); Reid Allison &
Adam Duhlberg, Antitrust Violations, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 403, 424–25 (2012).
354. Allison & Duhlberg, supra note 353, at 423 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351
(1943) (noting that state policy to displace competition and actively supervise cooperation confers
immunity from federal antitrust laws under the State Action Doctrine)).
355. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943).
356. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. F.T.C., 574 U.S. 494, 503 (2015) (citing Parker, 317
U.S. at 350–51).
357. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (“In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract
from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents
is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.”).
358. Id. at 360 (citation omitted).
359. Id. (quoting Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53 (1982).
360. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting
City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
361. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978).

2020]

Utility Pole Association Rules, Roles, and Risks

529

In 2013, the Court in F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. found that
the anticompetitive effect must have been the “‘foreseeable result’ of what the
State authorized.”362 In evaluating the actions of a Hospital Authority
established by a state, the Court in Phoebe Putney determined that the “stateaction immunity defense fails under the clear-articulation test because there is
no evidence the State affirmatively contemplated that hospital authorities would
displace competition by consolidating hospital ownership.” 363 As the Court
explained, “[m]ore is required to establish state-action immunity; the Authority
must show that it has been delegated authority not just to act, but to act or
regulate anticompetitively.”364
Active state supervision that confers federal antitrust immunity must include
state authority to approve or disapprove private participants’ actions.365 The
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners
v. F.T.C. emphasized that an “entity may not invoke Parker immunity unless the
actions in question are an exercise of the State’s sovereign power.”366 The
Sherman Act “confers immunity on the States’ own anticompetitive policies out
of respect for federalism,” but, the Court emphasized “it does not always confer
immunity where, as here, a State delegates control over a market to a nonsovereign actor.”367 As the Court explained, “[f]or purposes of Parker, a nonsovereign actor is one whose conduct does not automatically qualify as that of
the sovereign State itself.”368
The Court clarified that “[s]tate agencies are not simply by their governmental
character sovereign actors for purposes of state-action immunity.”369 Moreover,
“[i]mmunity for state agencies,” the Supreme Court emphasized in 2015
“requires more than a mere facade of state involvement, for it is necessary in
light of Parker ’s rationale to ensure the States accept political accountability for
anticompetitive conduct they permit and control.”370
A program “does not meet the second requirement for Parker immunity”
where, as in Midcal, the “State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the
prices established by private parties.”371 The Court emphasized that the
“national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a

362. F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 568 U.S. 216, 227 (2013).
363. Id. at 217.
364. Id. (citing Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 499 U.S. 365, 372 (1991)).
365. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. F.T.C., 574 U.S. 494, 507 (2015).
366. Id. at 504 (citation omitted).
367. Id. at 504–05 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (“[A] state does not give
immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring
that their action is lawful.”)).
368. Id. at 505 (citing Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–68 (1984)).
369. Id. (citing Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)).
370. Id. (citing F.T.C v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992)).
371. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
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gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing
arrangement.”372
As the Supreme Court has stressed, “[t]he mere presence of some state
involvement or monitoring does not suffice . . . The active supervision prong of
the Midcal test requires that state officials have and exercise power to review
particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail to
accord with state policy.”373 The mere potential for state supervision is not an
adequate substitute for a decision by the State.374
B. No State Action Immunity for the NCJPA’s Supermajority Voting
Requirements
The State of California’s policies to promote access to utility poles and lack
of active supervision of the JPCs indicate that neither the JPCs nor their
members, public or private, enjoy state action immunities to federal antitrust
laws. NCJPA’s Supermajority Voting Requirements and rules that contradict
CPUC policies find no antitrust shield under the State Action doctrine.375
California state policy is to promote competition for communications services
through access to utility poles, not to displace it.
Following passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the CPUC
adopted several decisions to promote communications competition including
through utility pole access.376 To promote competition, the CPUC’s 1998 ROW
decision, 98-10-058, expanded and defined the categories of communications
providers who could attach to utility poles.377
CPUC Decision 16-01-046 adopted rules promoting non-discriminatory
utility pole access for Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) providers by
allowing pole owners to charge the same fee for attachment as charged to CLECs
and cable television corporations.378 That decision contained the same language
as the CPUC’s 2007 GO 95 update requiring memorialization of the agreements
approved in the order “in separate, private agreements with affected utilities,
companies or municipalities or in the Northern California Joint Pole
Association’s Operating Routine.”379 The CPUC’s reference to the NCJPA’s
agreement as “private”380 underscores that the CPUC does not actively supervise
372. Id. at 106.
373. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
374. Id.
375. See generally id. at 100.
376. See generally Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding the Applicability of the
Commissions Right-of-Way Rules to Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Carriers, No. D. 16-01-046,
2016 WL 537758, at *1 (Jan. 28, 2016) [hereinafter CPUC Decision 16-01-046]; CPUC Decision
98-10-058 or ROW Decision, supra note 73, at 8.
377. CPUC Decision 98-10-058 or ROW Decision, supra note 73, at 22–24.
378. CPUC Decision 16-01-046, supra note 376, at 24-30, 130 (Conclusions of Law 8).
379. Id. at 40.
380. Id. at 66, 85.
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the NCJPA. State policies to promote utility pole competitive access
demonstrate that JPCs do not meet the first prong of the Phoebe Putney test for
state action federal antitrust immunity.
“The active supervision prong of the Midcal test requires that state officials
have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private
parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy.” 381 The State
of California does not actively supervise JPCs. The NCJPA and SCJPCs do not
report to the CPUC. JPC decisions are not subject to CPUC review.
The CPUC has invited NCJPA to send representatives to CPUC workshops,
and CPUC staff members have discussed concerns with NCJPA staff and
members.382 These workshop invitations and informal staff discussions are
insufficient to constitute active state supervision of JPCs. Lacking active state
supervision, the second prong of the Phoebe Putney test383 is not met.
Nor are JPCs state agencies. Although several CPUC decisions recognized
that the NCJPA and SCJPC adopt procedures and standards in the handbooks
they developed outside of the CPUC’s purview, the CPUC description of these
“private” agreements underscore the lack of state sanction.384
While some municipalities are members of California JPCs, municipalities are
subdivisions of the state, not state sovereigns entitled to antitrust immunity under
the U.S. federalist system of government.385 Neither are municipally-owned
utilities or irrigation districts state sovereigns under the U.S federalist
structure.386
Failing both prongs of F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.,387 state
action immunity is not available to JPCs or their members. JPC functions,
including their standard-setting outside of CPUC supervision, their membership
rules, cost and information sharing, and maintenance processes and standards
raise competition, safety, reliability, affordability, and other concerns. JPCs
have no immunities from federal or state antitrust or unfair competition scrutiny.
State and federal antitrust and unfair competition scrutiny of JPCs is merited to
protect competition.
This Article urges the CPUC to promptly examine JPC rules and functions,
and take steps to protect safety, reliability, competition, affordability, and to help
achieve state environmental goals. Such an examination would not, however,
381. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101.
382. See generally Simms, supra note 21; Utility Pole Proceeding (I.17-06-027) Workshop,
supra note 252.
383. F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 568 U.S. 216, 225.
384. CPUC Decision 16-01-046, supra note 376, at 40; Opinion Adopting Proposed Rule 94
in General Order 95 Dealing with Installation of Wireless Antennas on Utility Poles, Decision 0702-030, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 19 (Feb. 15, 2007), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/
WORD_PDF/FINAL_DECISION/64657.PDF.
385. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
386. See Lafayette v. La, Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978).
387. Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 224–225, 227.
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be sufficient to confer antitrust immunity on JPCs as they are neither state
instrumentalities, nor supervised by the state. Utility pole associations remain
subject to federal antitrust and unfair competition laws, state competition laws
such as the Cartwright Act, and California B&P Code § 17200.388
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Yet they are ours. We made them.
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles”
Proper utility pole and infrastructure management can reduce devastating
wildfires, prevent loss of life, reduce property damage and destruction, and
forestall wildfire carbon emissions.389 Achieving climate change solutions
increasingly depends on electric and communications services, many of which
are attached to utility poles. Like layers of bark that make a tree into a strong
utility pole, safety, reliability, competition, and service are intertwined values
manifested in infrastructure and ROW regulation. Improving utility pole and
ROW governance increases safety, enhances reliability and competition, and
speeds deployment of innovative energy and communications services that
support climate change solutions.
The CPUC owes no deference to JPCs, their rules, or the functions JPCs have
assumed. Climate change and the acceleration of utility-caused fires demand
more enforcement of utility pole violations. Searching analysis of JPCs’ role in
pole access and maintenance must be part of that safety and reliability
examination. The CPUC, antitrust and unfair competition authorities, must
concurrently examine JPCs’ role in erecting barriers to competition and raising
rivals’ costs.
This Article offers a five-point framework for utility pole, conduit, row (PCR)
access regulation in California. These principles may also serve as a model for
other states and jurisdictions:
1. Protect Safety First!
 Promptly address hazards and CPUC rule violations on PCR before
they fuel safety or reliability problems.
 Do not allow incumbents to undermine safety and reliability, or delay
or thwart competition by violating CPUC pole and PCR rules, e.g.,
not moving facilities to new poles within 60 days.

388. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16700 (commonly known as the Cartwright Act); Sandoval,
Contested Places, Utility Pole Spaces, supra note 55.
389. See Associated Press, California Wildfires’ Carbon Emissions Equal a Year of Power
Pollution, NBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/californiawildfires-carbon-emissions-equal-year-power-pollution-n942756.
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Do not allow incumbents to engage in private, unsupervised
standard-setting. Standards for PCR work must be decided in an open
process administered by the CPUC.
2. Foster competition for utility PCR access for those authorized by the
CPUC to attach
 Enforce CPUC, antitrust, and unfair competition laws to protect
competition. Do not allow incumbents to veto competitors or raise
barriers to access through concerted agreements.
3. Develop situational awareness about PCR to protect safety and
reliability and promote competition
 Map PCR including attachments, owners, lessors, location, and other
data through a comprehensive database accessible to the CPUC,
authorized attachers, and pole owners.
4. Administer PCR access and maintenance through a neutral, 3rd
party non-profit overseen by the CPUC, not incumbents
5. Robust, prompt, and well-equipped enforcement and inspection
protects safety, reliability, and competition
 Give the CPUC enforcement mechanisms including personnel,
communications, and information tools necessary for PCR analysis,
inspection, and enforcement.
These principles put safety at the forefront of utility pole and ROW
regulation.390
At the CPUC’s April 2019 workshop examining PG&E’s Governance,
Management, and Safety Culture, I observed that some utilities and regulated
entities have attempted to evade regulatory oversight or rules by characterizing
a practice as not a safety issue.391 I cited examples where utility pole owners
classified leaning poles as not a safety issue, and failed to take action on or report
hazards caused by other utility pole owners or attachers.392 Instead, pole owners
and attachers should lean toward classifying CPUC utility pole rule violations
as safety issues and promptly repair hazards. JPC private standard-setting, lack
of CPUC oversight of JPCs, and delayed compliance with safety rules such as
GO 95 create unacceptable safety risks.
The CPUC must promptly address joint pole owner and attacher attempts to
evade regulatory responsibility for complying with utility pole safety rules.
Through swift enforcement action the CPUC must end the practice of shifting

390. See Sandoval, Contested Places, Utility Pole Spaces, supra note 55, at 7 (proposing a
safety-centric utility infrastructure regulation framework that promotes competitive access and
neutral administration).
391. Catherine Sandoval, Public Discussion on Pacific Gas and Electric Forums on
Governance, Management, and Safety Culture Part II: Forum on Governance, Management, and
Safety
Culture,
ADMINMONITOR
Timestamp
9:25-10:30
(April
26,
2019),
http://www.adminmonitor.com/ca/cpuc/workshop/20190426/.
392. Id. at 1:31:00–1:32:40.
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millions from joint pole owners to electric ratepayers or shareholders by not
paying bills such as $3.5 million for joint pole vegetation management costs.393
The CPUC should examine whether a different system for utility pole
governance, access, and maintenance would better serve the state’s safety,
competition, and service goals. The CPUC should consider whether an
independent non-profit administrator, instead of a membership association of
incumbent pole owners and some pole attachers, would better facilitate pole
access and administration of pole transactions consistent with CA PU Code 851.
A pole database, like a multiple listing service for pole attachment and space
availability, if properly and neutrally managed and secured, can facilitate safety,
competition, and reliability.
The CPUC should examine whether JPC rules and roles are inconsistent with
the CPUC’s competitive access policies, and act to remove undue barriers to
competition erected by agreements between regulated entities and JPC members.
Supermajority voting requirements allow incumbents to raise rivals’ costs and
delay competition by not attending the voting meeting so no quorum is formed
to consider a prospective member’s application. JPC rules permit tactics that
protect incumbents, harm competition, and limit consumer choice.
The NCJPA proffered no justification for its restrictive membership process
and supermajority quorum and voting rules. The CPUC determines who is
eligible to attach to utility poles, not a private association of incumbent attachers.
NCJPA’s supermajority quorum and voting requirements limit access to
competitor information and cost sharing benefits, technical routines and
procedures. These rules and JPC functions appear to unduly delay competition,
raise rivals’ costs, and reduce competition’s benefits to consumers.
The CPUC determines which entities are eligible to access utility poles and
thus limits the freedom of the trader (the utility pole owner) to choose with
whom to deal. JPC supermajority voting requirements effectively act as an
improper refusal to deal by utilities who have a regulatory duty to grant access
to competitors qualified to attach by CPUC decisions. Competitors are not
entitled to erect barriers to utility pole attachment through industry association
agreements and concerted action.
NCJPA would be well-advised to drop supermajority quorum and
membership rules. State and federal antitrust authorities should examine
NCJPA’s supermajority quorum and voting requirements as potential violations
of the Sherman Act or state unfair competition law.
The CPUC should promptly examine the anticompetitive effect of JPC rules
and roles in its utility pole census and competition OII and OIR. The CPUC
should use its jurisdiction over utility records under CA PU Code 313 to obtain
information about JPC agreements, rules, and procedures. The CPUC should
issue an order to investor-owned utility members of JPCs to ensure that JPCs do

393. See PG&E, Pender GRC Testimony, supra note 113, at 15-2.
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not impede competitive access the CPUC authorizes or the CPUC’s safety rules,
standards, and procedures.
NCJPA has failed to file as a non-profit, despite representing that it would do
so for more than twenty-three years. The lack of non-profit status for either JPC
keeps their activities behind a veil of unpublished rules and procedures,
contributing to lack of transparency or oversight. The CPUC should issue an
Order to Show Cause to examine whether the NCJPA violated rule 1.1 by
representing to the CPUC that it is “formedto [sic] be formed”394 as a non-profit.
Representing the NCJPA as a non-profit may have deterred more rigorous
government oversight into their operations. Those representations may have
induced POUs and IOUs to join and put their poles under JPC rules. These
representations have competitive consequences.
The California AG should examine whether representations about JPCs’ nonprofit status are false or misleading or constitute unfair competition under
California B&P Code § 17200.395 The California AG’s office should also
examine NCJPA and SCJPC state tax liability, filing requirements, any asserted
exemptions, and the lack of any filings for non-profit or other corporate status.
The CPUC has the authority and duty to examine whether regulated entities
are circumventing the CPUC’s asset transfer approval process CA PU Code §
851 requires through JPC-facilitated transactions.396 Utility poles are a regulated
asset whose disposition affects the public interest. The CPUC must ensure that
regulated utilities are not selling or disposing of utility assets through JPCs
without complying with California statute and CPUC rules.
“They blend along small-town streets, Like a race of giants that have faded
into mere mythology,” John Updike observed in his poem Telephone Poles.397
These humble poles, first used more than 176 years ago for telegraph lines,398
remain the backbone of modern communications and electric systems. Utility
poles are so ubiquitous that we often fail to see them. We take for granted the
multi-billion-dollar inventory of utility poles, wires, and facilities lining our
streets. Yet, our modern economy, Internet, telephone service, cable and many
video services, electricity, and the activities these services empower, all depend
on access to the utility pole.
The CPUC has the authority to do “all things . . . necessary” to carry out its
authority,399 and to ensure that utilities provide safe, reliable service, with
adequate facilities, consistent with just and reasonable rates and the state’s
394. Simms, supra note 21, at 6.
395. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2019).
396. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 851(a) (1951).
397. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS, supra note 1.
398. Mulqueen, supra note 2, at 5–6.
399. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (“The commission may
supervise and regulate every public utility in the State and may do all things, whether specifically
designated in this part or in addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of
such power and jurisdiction.”).
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environmental goals. The CPUC’s duty to protect public safety is paramount.
Competition, safety, reliability, and service are intertwined values that govern
utility pole access and administration. The CPUC must promptly act to protect
competition, public safety, affordability and access, and mitigate climate change
by adopting utility pole governance that safeguards these values.

